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Carolina V. Zuccotti
Harry Ganzeboom
Ayse Guveli

Department of Quantitative Social Science

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Department of Quantitative Social Science, Institute of Education, University of London
20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, UK

Was migrating beneficial? Comparing social mobility of Turks in Western Europe to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives

Carolina V. Zuccotti[1], Harry Ganzeboom[2] and Ayse Guveli[3]

Abstract

Research on educational and occupational achievement of immigrants in Europe has mainly followed an *assimilationist* approach, focused on comparisons with natives or other immigrant groups (see for example Heath & Cheung 2007). However, this may not be at all the perspective that migrants themselves find most relevant, if we assume that people move to improve their life chances relative to what they would have been in the origin society without migrating. Following this argument, the paper studies social mobility and status attainment among Turkish migrants and their descendants in nine Western European countries in comparison with Turks in Turkey (and native populations in Western Europe). The emphasis is therefore on the *origins*, through a twofold perspective: with respect to parents and with respect to non-migrants in Turkey. This way, the widely used approach of 'ethnic penalties' (also included in the analysis) is complemented with a focus on the benefits (and limitations) of migrating, not only in terms of average achievements with respect to those left behind, but also in terms of the possibilities that migration opens for social mobility processes. The study is based on a combined dataset from the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and the European Values Study (2008). Among the main findings, the paper shows that 'ethnic penalties' in terms of occupational status have been declining between the generations, as more Turks in Western Europe have been educated in the destination country. However, the comparison with Turks in Turkey shows that migration has not favoured immigrants on all accounts. While second generation Turks are on average less dependent on their parental background than Turks in Turkey, and those with lower class backgrounds (which comprises most of cases) are indeed better able to move relative to their parents in terms of education, they continue to be disadvantaged in terms of the occupations they get. This is due to the fact that in Turkey the same education leads to a higher occupational status, which makes the occupational 'gains' that second generation Turks obtain in Western Europe (on average) transform into lags with respect to those left behind. These lags also seem to be particularly pronounced for higher educated women.

JEL classification: J15

Keywords: Turkish migrants; first generation; second generation; Turks in Turkey; social mobility; status attainment

[1] European University Institute (Carolina.zuccotti@eui.eu)
[2] Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (h.b.g.Ganzeboom@yu.nl)
[3] University of Essex (aguveli@essex.ac.uk)

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INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, facilitated by labour import contracts between the countries, a number of Western European industries hired Turkish workers. Although migration of Turks was intended to be temporary and contracts were phased out after 1974, many labour migrants stayed and their numbers were bolstered by subsequent family reunification and chain migration. Turkish origin residents are now the largest extra-communitarian immigrant group in Western Europe.

Much of the research on first and second generation migrants in Europe concerns the integration of the Turkish origin population in destination societies. Such studies centre on educational and labour market achievements of migrants, in comparison to natives and/or other migrant groups (Crul and Vermeulen 2003 and related articles from the same journal issue; Euwals, Dagevos et al. 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Phalet and Heath 2010; Kogan 2011). However, this may not be the perspective that migrants themselves find most relevant. People do not move in order to compete with other groups in the destination society but to improve their life chances – and their children's – relative to what they would have been in the origin society. In other words, to understand international migration and its effects on those who have decided to build a life abroad, we must consider social origins. In this paper we do so in two different but equally important ways. First, we compare individuals to their parents, by studying intergenerational mobility (or the reverse: intergenerational reproduction) in both education and occupation. Second, we compare those who migrated to Western Europe – and their children – to those who stayed in the origin country, Turkey. This latter perspective leads to a counterfactual view of the outcomes of migration: what would have happened to Turkish migrants, had they decided to stay in Turkey? Or, more specifically, what would the occupation of first generation Turks, as well as the education and occupation of their descendants, be had they not migrated to Western Europe?

This study adds a novel perspective to social stratification and migration studies. Rather than (solely) focusing on the widely used 'ethnic penalties' approach, which compares migrants with natives in destination countries (Heath and Cheung 2007), the paper looks at the benefits of migrating – for those who migrated and their children – in terms of achievements compared to those left behind and possibilities for upward social mobility. In practice, we study status attainment and social mobility (or social reproduction) processes among Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks in Western Europe, and Western European natives. Our dataset combines the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and European Values Study (2008); thus, data cover Turks in their most common Western European destinations and in Turkey.

TURKS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Social and economic developments in Western Europe and Turkey made these two areas into receiving and sending migration regions, respectively, in the early 1960s. While Western Europe's economic growth after World War II created a need for a low-skilled labour force, its educational expansion decreased the number of low-skilled job seekers. Lacking spontaneous immigration from former colonies and with increasing job vacancies in manufacturing, mining, construction and the service industry, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Sweden (countries with the largest Turkish population today) looked for new sources of manpower. A 'guest worker' system

was introduced, consisting of formal labour import agreements between these countries and Turkey (Akgündüz 2008).

At the same time, important transformations were taking place in Turkey. Between the founding years of the Turkish Republic and the 1960s, Turkey witnessed a dramatic population growth, which provoked mass movements from rural to urban areas (Kocaman 2008). Urbanization had increased by 17% in 1935, 42% in 1975 and 70% in 2011 (Karadayi 1974; UNDP 2013). Yet Turkey had failed to implement large-scale industrialization; thus, unemployment became an issue, together with other social and economic problems, such as big-city ghettos, segregation and poverty (Kıray 1982). In this context, the 'excess labour' – including workers in agriculture and artisans – had to choose between becoming part of the impoverished urban poor or searching for other ways to maintain their income and wellbeing. Temporary migration to Western Europe appeared a good solution; it even became an option for the urban middle class and low-ranking government officials (Akgündüz 2008).

After labour import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to migrate to Western Europe, mainly through family reunion and chain migration. In 1973, the number of Turks in Western Europe totalled 1.35 million, of whom 900.000 were workers and 450.000 dependants. In spite of return flows, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about 2 million in 1980, 3 million in 2006, and now stands at 4 million (Abadan-Unat 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2012; UNDP 2013). However, as this is based on figures that only include Turkish citizens, there is likely many more of Turkish descent. The majority of Turks reside in Germany, with sizeable groups in France and the Netherlands.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Earlier we mentioned the importance of considering the origins in the study of integration of migrants in host societies. We have learnt from previous studies (Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath and Li 2010; Phalet and Heath 2010) that the comparison with native populations is important to assess 'ethnic penalties', a concept that refers to the difference between migrants and natives that remains after background characteristics have been taken into account. However, the comparison with those left behind is necessary to have a complete view of the outcomes of migration. The literature on international migration has hardly addressed the position of migrants and their children from this angle. With the exception of studies related to the 'selection of migrants' (see for example Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Dronkers and De Heus 2009) and those coming from the economy field – interested in earnings (see Massey et. al, 1993, for a review) – the main concern among social scientists in this field has been the comparison with the native populations and/or other migrant groups.

Following the rational choice theories, people usually move in search for a better life and if they think that the opportunities in destination will be better than in the current place of location (or the gains higher than the costs) (Sjaastad 1962). It is to be expected, therefore, that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and career advancement. In fact, one of the main objectives of migrants that move for economic reasons – as it is the case of Turks – is to improve theirs and, especially, their children's lives with respect to what they would have been back home. This, in many cases, also presupposes a wish

for an intergenerational improvement, that is, a desire for upward mobility from parents to children.

This paper studies educational and occupational attainment, as well as processes of social mobility for four groups: first generation Turks, that is, Turks who were born and mostly educated in Turkey; second generation Turks, that is, Turks who were born or mostly educated in Western Europe; Turks in Turkey; and natives in Western Europe. Below we detail the model of analysis, as well as the hypotheses and mechanisms that support them.

MIGRATION, STATUS ATTAINMENT AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Migrants and the OED model

In order to study status attainment and social mobility, our study makes use of the so-called OED (Origin-Education-Destination) model, initially developed – with a higher complexity[4] - by Blau and Duncan (1967). This model also serves as a guide for our hypotheses in the paper.

In the OED model (see Figure 1a), two forms of reproduction are shown: with respect to education and with respect to occupation. On the one hand, social origins affect education: parents, for example, influence their children by helping them with their homework, sending them to better schools or paying for extra-curricular help (OE). On the other, social origins affect occupation. This occurs both in an indirect way and in a direct way. By following the above-mentioned mechanisms, the indirect effect occurs because high status families more successfully position their children in higher education than low status families (OE), and education has a value in the labour market, determining occupational outcomes (ED). The direct effect of social origins on occupation (OD) occurs through different mechanisms: for example, parents influence their children by giving them job advice, helping them to look for a job, providing them with economic resources, transferring ability and cognitive skills, offering social and relational aptitudes and supplying a wide range of networks and connections, among others.

<< FIGURE 1 >>

Our study is based on the assumption that each of the three main components of the OED model may play out differently for each of the groups considered in this study. This is expressed in arrows A1-A3 in Figures 1b and 1c, which include the group variable (G): Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks and Western European natives. In practical terms, this approach implies that we expect to find different social reproduction patterns among the groups. Arrow A1 in Figure 1b expresses differences in terms of educational reproduction (OE); arrow A2 in Figure 1c expresses differences in terms of the direct effect of parental background on occupation (OD); and arrow A3 expresses differences in terms of returns to education (ED). In this regard, note that looking at returns to education and, more generally, at the value of education in the labour market for the different groups, means acknowledging that that these groups are also inserted in different labour market contexts: an 'average Western European' labour market and a 'Turkish' labour market.

[4] In the original model, the first occupation is also included.

Figure 1b and 1c also contain 'ethnic penalties' with respect to education (GE) and with respect to occupation (GD). These represent the average net difference between migrants and native populations in educational and occupational outcomes that may remain after background characteristics have been taken into account. This effect – which might refer to many things, like discrimination in destination, cultural differences regarding the role of work or economic and social context factors – will affect average differences between Turks in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey and natives in destination societies.

Note, however, that the existence of differences in social reproduction implicitly assumes that the size of 'ethnic penalties' might also depend on levels of social origins and education. For example, Platt (2005b; 2007) – who studied social mobility patterns among ethnic minorities in the UK – found that Caribbean are less dependent on their parental backgrounds than the British, which prevents them from benefiting from higher origins. On the one hand, this led Caribbean to be penalized among those with higher social backgrounds; on the other, however, this outcome also implied that they were practically not penalized among those with lower social backgrounds. In this regard, the 'baselines' or 'intercepts' (i.e. the value of the dependent variable when the independent one is at the minimum) are crucial for assessing whether depending more or less on the parents, or whether getting more or less occupation as education increases, are actually beneficial outcomes or not in comparative terms. For example, if Caribbean had been advantaged with respect to the British among those with lower backgrounds, not gaining from high backgrounds would have probably not lead to ethnic penalties. Equally, lower returns to education among migrants might not necessarily mean penalization among the higher educated if they have started with an advantage among the lower educated.

Mechanisms and hypotheses

Having presented the model, the obvious question is: to what extent are there different social reproduction patterns for Turks in Western Europe, compared to Turks in Turkey (and presumably) to natives in destination countries? And, in a second instance: if there are differences, what are the consequences? In what follows we focus on the OED model to derive our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 refers to first generation Turks and discusses only occupational outcomes; hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to the second generation Turks and discuss both educational and occupational outcomes.

Hypothesis 1 (first generation)

Our first expectation is that first generation Turks will have lower social reproduction levels with respect to occupation than Turks in Turkey and Western European natives. This will be expressed, first, by a lower direct effect of parental background on occupations (OD) and, second, by lower returns to education (ED). Moreover we expect them to experience 'ethnic penalties' in destination (GD).

We expect a lower effect of parental background on occupations because when migrating, in addition to their country, first generation immigrants also leave their parents behind, and with them, the resources that may affect their occupations. Regarding lower returns to education and average factors ('ethnic penalties'), the literature has shown that upon arrival international migrants suffer not only from adaptation problems (language, culture, etc.) and discrimination, but their educational

qualifications, if any, are not always recognized, for which they end up, in many cases, doing work for which they are over-qualified (Heath and Cheung 2007; Johnston, Sirkeci et al. 2010). While in terms of income and employment, immigrants might find better chances outside their home country, many first generations experience 'ethnic penalties' in occupation and their gains in education do not usually have the same effect as it has for Western European natives (Van Tubergen, Maas et al. 2004; Kogan 2006; Algan, Dustmann et al. 2010).

How these differences will affect the comparison between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey will depend on whether the role of education and parental background are different between Western Europe and Turkey or not. For example, although depending less on parental resources might be detrimental for migrants who have parents with high social backgrounds, it might actually be positive for those who have left their low parental backgrounds behind, as it is the case of the majority of first generation Turks. In other words, this might give an overall advantage to first generation Turks compared to Turks in Turkey. However, we also need to consider the role of education. We expect that for first generation Turks, transforming their education into a compatible occupation is more difficult not only compared to Western European natives but also to Turks in Turkey. In other words, the relationship between education and occupation should be looser for first generation Turks. But whether they do worse than those left behind will depend on the value of education in Turkish and Western European labour markets, that is, on what kind of occupations individuals get – on average – for different educational levels. A final point to consider refers to unmeasured factors, for example, discrimination in the labour market. This will have a negative impact for Turks in Western Europe and might therefore favour Turks in Turkey when making the comparison.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b (second generation)

With respect to the fortunes of the children of immigrants, there has been an ample debate. Although some studies – particularly in the US – have noted that disadvantages might persist over generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997), others have shown that an improvement is likely to happen over time and, more importantly, that the children of immigrants are likely to do better than their parents. This is expected to happen especially when parents have arrived with very low social backgrounds (Zhou, Lee et al. 2008), as it is the case of Turks.

In what follows we hypothesize that the children of Turks not only will do better than their parents, but also that will be less dependent on them – in terms of education and occupation – compared to Turks in Turkey (and, presumably, to natives in Western Europe). In other words, we expect to find general lower social reproduction levels for Turks in Western Europe than for Turks in Turkey, and we expect these to be mainly the product of higher educational mobility (that is, weaker OE) (*hypothesis 2a*) and of a weaker direct effect of parental occupation on that of their children's (OD) (*hypothesis 2b*). This is expressed in arrows A1 and A2 in Figure 1c. Furthermore, we also argue we expect these processes to locate second generation Turks in a better position with respect to those left behind in terms of education (while for occupation results are more uncertain).

According to Goldthorpe (2000), one of the main driving forces behind the stability of the class structure and the reason why, on average, the children of higher class parents do better than the children of lower class parents is that people's priority is to achieve the

class of the parents or, more specifically, to avoid downward mobility. In this context, for the majority (or native population) achieving upward social mobility is a second-level concern. However, this reasoning might not apply to some ethnic minorities. Arguably, immigrants who arrive in a country, then decide to stay and raise a family, will want to see better lives for their children and will therefore invest in them (Dustmann 2008). For example, a study for Germany shows that the influence of the father's education on the chances of children reaching the *Abitur* is smaller for second generation Turks than for natives (Kristen and Granato 2007). While this implies that a higher parental education is less of an advantage for Turks than for native populations, it can also be interpreted as showing that a low starting point – common among the descendants of Turkish immigrants – might not be as detrimental for Turks as it is for the native population. Motivation and high parental aspirations are often used to explain educational mobility among ethnic minorities (Heath, Rothon et al. 2008). In fact, there is evidence that the parents of second-generation Turks have particularly high aspirations for their children (Abadan-Unat 2011). Following these arguments, a lower dependence on the (usually low) parental background among Turks in Western Europe, will mean better educational outcomes compared to those left behind. Supporting this idea, there is a recent study that shows that Turkish children in Europe perform better (higher PISA test scores) than children in Turkey, given equal parental backgrounds (Dustmann, Frattini et al. 2012). Note that 'ethnic penalties' might also occur and counterbalance this outcome, although previous studies have shown that most of the gap in educational outcomes between the children of migrants and the natives is related to the relatively lower parental backgrounds of the former (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Kristen and Granato 2007; Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007; Heath, Rothon et al. 2008).

We saw in the OED model that the parental effect on occupation is mediated by the role of education: in the case of second generation, we expect education to be the main channel for social mobility. Additionally, and for similar reasons than those expressed for educational outcomes, we also expect to see a weaker direct effect of (the relatively low) parental class on children's occupations (OD). In fact, the parental pressure to do well in the destination country might also be expressed in a direct encouragement to find a good job and progress in a career, which will mean improvement for second generation Turks. In other words, we expect second generation Turks to depend less on their parental background than Turks in Turkey, not only in terms of education, but also with regard to the direct effect of parents on children's occupations. Given that most second generation Turks have low parental backgrounds, this should give them an advantage with respect to Turks in Turkey.

With regard to the value of education, in principle, returns to education (ED) for second generation Turks should be the same as for the natives in Western Europe, because they have been educated in the destination country. In this respect, how well Turks in Western Europe do with respect to those left behind will mostly depend on how much occupational status can be obtained in Turkey and Western Europe for different levels of education. Finally, the existence of 'ethnic penalties' for second generation Turks might affect (in a negative way) their comparison with Turks in Turkey. The low performance for second generation migrants has, in fact, been acknowledged by previous studies that explore access to higher status jobs in comparison to native populations (Crul and Doomernik 2003; Simon 2003; Kogan 2006; Heath and Cheung 2007; Silberman, Alba et al. 2007; Heath, Rothon et al. 2008). However, most of these studies do not consider parental background the class of origin in their models, generating possibly a bias in their conclusions. A summary of our hypotheses and mechanisms is presented in Table 1.

<< TABLE 1 >>

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Our analysis is based on data from the European Social Survey (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010: rounds 1 to 5) and one round of the European Values Study (2008). Taken together, these six surveys cover almost all European populations and Turkey, making it possible to compare Turkish migrants (and their descendants), Turkish non-migrants and the Western European native population. While primarily social attitudes surveys, ESS and EVS stand out for their detailed inventory of migration status, with questions on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival, nationality and language spoken at home. Both have relatively good information on parents' educations and occupations, as well as the respondent's corresponding status. There are minor differences in how the data are collected and processed, both between ESS and EVS and between ESS rounds, which we note below.

Using the migration inventory in the data, we have created four main comparison groups:

- Turks in Turkey,
- Turks in Western Europe:
    - First generation (born *and* mostly educated in Turkey),
    - Second generation (born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe),
- Natives in Western Europe.

Our definition of 'Turks in Western Europe' has a minor variation between ESS round 1 and the rest. For ESS rounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 and EVS, we consider Turks as those individuals interviewed in Western Europe who were either born in Turkey, have at least one parent born in Turkey (more than 90% have two parents born in Turkey) or have Turkish citizenship. For ESS round 1, we define Turks as those who speak Turkish as a first or second language, are Turkish citizens or were born in Turkey. ESS round 1 only asks for the *continent* of birth for parents, a particularly ambiguous measure, as 12% of Turks live in the European part of Turkey. Western European natives and Turks in Turkey, meanwhile, are those who, along with their parents, were born in one of the Western European countries in our sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to nine countries where Turkish migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Germany, Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. We exclude neighbouring countries Bulgaria and Greece on the grounds that persons of Turkish descent in these countries are generally not labour migrants; we also exclude Luxembourg because it has few Turks. All these countries are available in both surveys and all rounds, except for Austria, which is not available in ESS rounds 4 and 5 and Turkey, which is not available in ESS rounds 1, 3 and 5.

Although ESS and EVS are part of large-scale projects with standardized procedures for collecting data, for which comparability is respected, a possible weakness is the representation of migrants, including Turks. For example, as questionnaires are only in the language of the country, it could be argued that less educated and more recent migrants are underrepresented in the sample. Three comments: first, although we are studying first and second generations, the crucial comparisons are those with the latter group, as their outcomes express longer-term processes of integration and are therefore more interesting when compared to Western European natives and Turks in Turkey. Second, and more importantly, even if only the better-off Turks (in terms of education

and occupation) are present in the sample, we are making use of a crucial variable to control for this: the parental background. Finally, we have compared our results with those found in a previous cross-national study on 'ethnic penalties' (Heath and Cheung 2007), and they go in the same direction. More specifically, we have studied the access to the service class[5] for second generation Turks and Western European natives (only in ESS rounds). When controlling for age and education, the results are very similar to those found in the above mentioned study: we found a negative effect – or 'ethnic penalty' – for second generation Turks when compared to natives.

Our criterion for defining first and second generation Turks is place of education. We use a 'majority' rule by which individuals are assigned to the first generation if they were born *and* completed most of their education (>50%) in Turkey and to the second generation if they were born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe. For individuals born in Turkey, the differentiation between first and second generations uses the age of the person, the age of arrival in the destination country, and the estimated age when the person finished education. We have approximated the years of education necessary to finish a certain educational level, assuming that individuals enter the educational system at age six[6]. For example, a person who finished upper secondary education (around age 18) and emigrated at age 15 is considered to have done most of his/her studies in Turkey but if emigrating at age 10 is considered to have done the majority in Western Europe. This variable is easily constructed in ESS round 5 and the EVS, as they collect the precise age of arrival. For rounds 1-4 of the ESS the variable was approximated, given that the exact year or age of arrival was not collected[7].

Table 2 shows the distribution of the four comparison groups by survey/round and destination country. The proportion of first and second generation Turks is very similar in all data sources. Note that while our respondents are disproportionately situated in Germany, Turks in Germany are underrepresented (when compared, for example, to Turkish figures[8]); this is the logical consequence of the ESS sampling design.

<< TABLE 2 >>

The time of arrival is a key piece of information. First, the vast majority of the first generation Turks in our data (around 70%) arrived in 1980 or later, probably migrating as

[5] We created the service class using the syntax in: http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco88/index.htm.

[6] Following UNESCO (2006) age limits are: not completed primary education (6-9 years old); primary education or first stage of basic education (6-12 years old); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (6-15 years old); (upper) secondary education (6-18 years old); post-secondary non-tertiary education (6-20 years old); first stage of tertiary education (6-22 years old); second stage of tertiary education (6-26 years old). When ISCED was missing, we used the declared years of education.

[7] Instead of the exact variable, crude categories were used: arrived last year; between 1 and 5 years; between 6 and 10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and 21 years and more. For the first two categories, we have assumed education was mostly done in Turkey. For the latter three we have therefore *approximated* the likelihood of having finished more than 50% of education in the country of destination by creating a continuous variable running from 0 to 1. To see how this works, consider a 23-year old person with primary education who emigrated between 11 and 20 years ago. This person studied between the ages of 6 and 13 and arrived in Western Europe between the ages of 3 and 12 (all approximate values). In total, primary studies take around 7 years. If the person emigrated at 10, 11 or 12 years old, we assume he/she completed most education in Turkey (at least 4 years out of 7). If the person emigrated at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 years of age, we consider that most studies were completed in Western Europe. This person receives a value of 7/10 (or 0.7): in 7 out of the 10 possible ages of arrival, he/she did most of his/her education in Western Europe. This continuous variable was later dichotomized: those with values up to 0.5 were assigned to the first generation and those higher than 0.5 were assigned to the second generation (around 30% of all Turks have intermediate values).

[8] Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Abadan-Unat, 2011).

part of family reunion or chain migration processes. Second, among second generation Turks born in Turkey rather than the destination country (36%), around 78% arrived before 1980, thus living more than 20 years in the destination country[9].

As for other variables, the respondents and their parents' educational qualifications are measured with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), which ranges from 0 (incomplete primary) to 6 (postgraduate level of tertiary education). We scale these into approximate years of education[10] and replace the missing cases with the declared years of education completed (for respondents only). We prefer qualifications scaled by duration over stated duration, following Hout and DiPrete (2006). In the EVS, only the father's education is collected, except for households headed by single mothers. For parents in the ESS, we consider the maximum value of father and mother. In all surveys, the reference time for parental information (and for occupation) is when the respondent is 14 years old.

Respondents' occupations (current or last) are measured with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which is available for all countries and rounds: these have been transformed into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996), which varies between16 and 90. For parental occupations, in EVS the respondent is asked about the father's occupation (for single mother households, the mother's occupation is considered) and in ESS, both the father and mother's occupation. In all surveys, ISCO codes are available for most cases, but the ESS also has crude self-classification scores, which are converted into their approximate ISCO equivalent. For ESS, we first convert both detailed ISCO and crude measures into ISEI scores (for father and mother); we then take the average between both ISEI versions (for father and mother); finally, we consider the maximum value between both parents.

The analysis is based on OLS regressions; we run separate models for men and women. Educational attainment is analysed for people between 25 and 65, while occupational attainment covers people from 18 to 65. We exclude those older than 65, given the very few older Turks in Western Europe.

ANALYSIS

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables broken down by comparison group and gender. Parental educational and occupational statuses are higher for first generation Turks than for those who stayed behind, and this also applies to their education. These values point to a positive selection of Turks. As for the occupational status of first generation Turks, despite the differences in education and parental backgrounds favouring the migrants, they have either similar (men) or lower (women) occupational statuses than their counterparts in Turkey. Moreover, unlike Turks in Turkey, first generations tend to maintain the level of their parents' occupational statuses. Finally, we also observe an important gap in terms of ISEI when comparing to natives in Western Europe, as most previous literature has shown.

[9] These values refer to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents' ISEI.

[10] Not completed primary education (3.25 years); primary education or first stage of basic education (6.5 years); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (9.5 years); (upper) secondary education (13 years); post-secondary non-tertiary education (14.25); first stage of tertiary education (16.5 years); and second stage of tertiary education (20.5 years).

<<TABLE 3>>

With regard to second generation Turks, Table 3 reveals that they have clearly moved up the educational hierarchy relative to those left behind and to their parents; however have not quite reached the level of Western European natives. For occupational status, the means show that second generation Turks are collectively quite mobile relative to their parents and are approaching (but not quite reaching) the level of Western European natives. The comparison of means with respect to Turks in Turkey reveals that, in spite of their higher levels of education, second generation male Turks have occupational statuses that are only slightly higher compared to that of those left behind, and women have even lower statuses. Note, however, that in Turkey, the number of women with a valid ISEI score is much smaller. More specifically, while in Turkey more than 70% of women have never worked (or do not declare so in this survey), in Western Europe this value drops to around 18% for second generation Turkish women. Recall as well that it is lower educated women who are most likely to be out of the labour market.

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the regression models for education and occupation for the four comparison groups, differentiated by gender. The age of the respondent is set at 35 and we have standardized the independent variables (parents' education and occupation and respondents' education) into z-scores so that they have equal standard deviations, making the coefficients comparable across equations[11]. Moreover, all models control for survey/round dummies (not shown). Finally, although we are interested in Turks in Western Europe (not Turks in a certain country), we explore country effects and compare the models with and without country dummies (tables available on request). The results on educational attainment are very similar in terms of main group and interaction effects. The results on occupational attainment show that country differences occur mainly in the average group effects: men in Germany are particularly disadvantaged in terms of occupational status compared to men in Turkey. However, the coefficients that express social mobility processes for the various groups are very similar between the models. For the purposes of this paper and the easiness of interpretations, we discuss the tables without country dummies. Finally, next to Tables 4 and 5 we have added Figures 2, 3 and 4, which represent Models 3a and 3b from Table 4 (Figure 2) and Models 4a and 4b from Table 5[12] (Figures 3 and 4).

<<TABLE 4 >>
<<TABLE 5 >>

Regarding *first generation Turks*, Table 4 shows that they have significantly higher levels of education than Turks in Turkey (the reference group in all models) (Models 1a and 1b in Table 4); this difference remains statistically significant even after controlling for parental background (Models 2a and 2b). Although education of first generations is not part of our theoretical background and hypotheses, it is interesting to note that they are a positively selected group (Models 2a and 2b); and that they are also disadvantaged when compared to Western European natives. Models 3b also reveals that first generation Turkish women are more educationally mobile than those who have remained (expressed by the negative interaction effect), having therefore an advantage among those with

[11] Note that, although group distributions are different, the results are the same with non-standardized coefficients.

[12] The predicted values in Figures 3-5 refer to individuals of 35 years old; variables not observed in the Figures are set to the mean. We have constructed the figures by means of margins and marginsplot commands in STATA (version 12.1).

lower parental backgrounds. Figure 2 shows this pattern clearly. Finally, Table 3 also shows that Turkey is a much less mobile society, at least in terms of education, than Western European countries: this is represented in the steeper line in Figure 2.

Following the first generation into the Western European labour market (see Table 5), we find that first generation Turkish women have lower occupational attainment than Turks in Turkey and Western European natives, while men are only disadvantaged with respect to the latter (Models 1a and 1b). After controlling for background characteristics (education playing the major role), the effect for first generation Turkish men becomes significantly negative, denoting a disadvantage with respect to Turks in Turkey; a similar effect is seen for women, but they suffer higher penalties in general. Note also the change in the effect for Western European natives (from positive to negative) implying that, on equal background conditions (again the effect being driven by education), a higher occupation is obtained in Turkey. This makes the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey bigger than the difference between the former and Western European natives (Models 2a and 2b).

For social reproduction processes (Models 3a and 3b), we do not find statistically significant results, although the negative effect points to a lower dependence of first generation Turks as compared to Turks in Turkey (and compared to Western European natives). This is mainly driven by lower returns to education – as partially expected in *hypothesis 1* – for first generation Turks compared to Western European natives and Turks in Turkey, in particular for women (note that among women, the returns to education are the highest in Turkey). These results can be better observed in Figure 4. Here we see that the higher the educational level, the higher the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey. For example, the prediction for men with 12 years of education is 39 ISEI points for first generation Turks and 42 ISEI points for Turks in Turkey; this 3-point difference rises to 6 points when comparing individuals with 15 years of education. Figure 3 also shows that among women gaps are bigger: comparisons made for individuals with 12 years of education show a gap of 12 points in the ISEI; while the gap for individuals with 15 years of education is of 15 points. However, it is important to remember that women that have (or have had a job) in Turkey are also very few, pointing to possible selection mechanisms for this group, not present in Western Europe.

The evidence presented for the first generation shows that, on average, migration to Europe has not brought an advantage in terms of occupation for most first generation Turks with respect to those left behind. Moreover, although we did not find a weaker direct effect of parental background on occupations (OD), we did found – in favour of *hypothesis 1* – that both men and women experience lower returns to education (ED) in the destination country. On the one hand, this makes those with relatively higher education more disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives. Note that the gap is even higher when comparing first generation women with their counterparts in Turkey, which speaks of differences in Western European and Turkish labour markets in terms of the value of education. On the other, for lower educated men the disadvantage practically disappears.

As for the *second generation*, Table 4 shows that on average (after controlling for age) second generation Turkish men and women are more educated than their counterparts in Turkey but are less educated than Western European natives (Models 1a and 1b). When controlling parental education and occupation (Models 2a and 2b), penalties compared to

Western European natives vanish for men, but remain statistically significant for women, although differences between the genders in educational achievement are neither large nor statistically significant. Meanwhile, the positive difference with respect to Turks in Turkey remains. Models 3a and 3b, finally, show that second generation Turks are more educationally mobile than Turks in Turkey (and also compared to Western European natives). Going to Figure 2, we observe that both men and women are particularly advantaged among those who have parents with lower educational levels (which comprises the majority of Turks in Western Europe). For example, while the predicted education for a male Turk in Turkey with parents averaging 6 years of education is 10 years of education, for a second generation Turk it is 12 years. Moreover, women are also advantaged among those with higher educational levels. This result confirms *hypothesis 2a*, that is, second generation Turks are – in their majority –doing better in terms of education than Turks in Turkey, and a weaker parental effect in their education (OE) mainly drive this.

Regarding occupational outcomes of second generation Turks (Table 5), Models 1a and 1b (which only control for age) show that, on average, the occupational status of second generations has improved with respect to that of the first generation. This is likely related to their educational improvements in the destination country. When we compare them to Turks in Turkey, we even observe an advantage for men. Nevertheless, the status of the second generation still remains lower than that of Western European natives. After controlling education and parental background (Models 2a and 2b), we observe an effect similar to the first generation: second generation Turks are now disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey. At the same time, differences with respect to Western European natives vanish[13]. In other words, although second generation Turks may have improved their situation in the destination country, under equal conditions, they may have had a better occupational status back home in Turkey.

For occupational mobility, Models 3a and 3b of Table 5 show the total contribution of the parental occupation, before the mediation of the level of education. For second generation Turks, the class of origin is much less important in determining the occupational achievements than it is for Turks in Turkey and also for Western European natives. This can be seen in the negative – and quite substantive – interaction coefficients for this group (although for women differences are not statistically significant). When education is added (Models 4a and 4b), the difference in the effect of parental occupation reduces substantially for both genders, showing the strong mediating role of education in intergeneration reproduction (although becomes statistically non-significant, not giving, therefore, good evidence for *hypothesis 2b*). Looking at the returns to education, we also observe that the effect of education is smaller for second generation Turks than for Turks in Turkey, although results are statistically significant only for women. The interplay between both processes, and the consequences this has for the

[13] Previous studies (see Heath and Cheung 2007) have found ethnic penalties for second generation Turks when studying the access to the service class. We have calculated this for the five ESS rounds (see footnote #1 for extra details) and found that – when controlling for age and education – there is a significant negative effect for second generation Turks when compared to native Western Europeans (pooled men and women). The same model for ISEI shows a negative effect as well, but non-significant. This reveals that the study of 'ethnic penalties' based on the ISEI draws a more favorable picture of second generation Turks in Western Europe, compared to the study based on the access to the service class. On top of this, a second crucial finding is that when the class of origin is introduced in both models, the negative effect disappears. This shows that the relatively lower parental background of second generation Turks helps explaining differences with respect to natives (something not discussed in previous studies on ethnic penalties).

comparison between second generation Turks and Turks in Turkey can be better observed in Figures 3 and 4. In these figures, the results for men point in the direction of a disadvantage for second generation Turks of at higher parental backgrounds and/or educational levels. For women, the results show that they are disadvantaged at all parental backgrounds and among those with higher educational levels. For example, while among women with 12 years of education there is a gap of 4 points in the ISEI, for women with 15 years of education the gap raises to 7 points.

All in all, the second generation is doing better than the first generation in terms of occupation and are integrating into the European labour market. These Turks are much less dependent on their parents' background, especially in terms of education (OE), which allows them to reach higher educational levels and, therefore, better jobs. Immigrating, thus, gives an initial advantage to the descendants of those with low social backgrounds, since the children can separate their outcomes from their (low) origins. However, this general advantage in terms of occupation vanishes once we control for education. In fact, in Turkey education has an overall greater value when accessing occupations, compared to Western Europe[14]. As a consequence, even if second generation Turks are not disadvantaged with respect to Western European natives, on equality of education, they have lower average occupational statuses than Turks in Turkey. In addition, in the case of women, there are also higher returns to education (ED) in Turkey – both with respect to Western European natives and with respect to second generation Turks – that make the gap increase among the higher educated (this pattern is similar to that observed for first generation women).

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Many studies on migrants' integration in Western Europe follow the perspective of 'ethnic penalties', that is, they compare migrants with native populations, on various outcomes including education and occupation. However, this perspective might not be the one that migrants themselves find most relevant. This paper has searched to give voice to this perspective by means of focusing in two comparisons, connected in practise: the comparison with social origins and the comparison with those left behind. Improving with respect to parents and with respect to those who remained in the origin country is, we believe, a priority for migrants who move for economic reasons. This perspective allows as well for a counterfactual question: what would have happened to migrants and their offspring had they decided to stay? These concerns were developed in comparisons between Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks and native populations in Western Europe.

The results have shown that, for first generation Turks, migration has led to lower occupational status than they would have obtained in Turkey. Their poor occupational performance in the destination countries is no surprise; economic gains, mainly in terms of money, are an important part of the motivation to move, but this often implies sacrifices in occupational status. Discrimination and difficulties in the labour market might play a role as well. Furthermore, we also observed that they possibly suffer from a lack of recognition of their educational credentials: their returns to education were lower compared to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives (as expected from *hypothesis 1*). Moreover, we also found that the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey was amplified by characteristics of the Turkish labour market itself. On

[14] This is an average Western European effect. Note, however, that it is mainly driven by Germany, also the country with the highest number of Turks.

the one hand, at equal education and parental background, in Turkey it is possible to attain higher occupations than in Western Europe, on average. On the other hand, and only for women, the returns to education are higher in Turkey (although, as we saw, women are much less likely to have an occupation in Turkey).

The outcomes for the second generation were fundamental to explore more long-term consequences of migration as well as disentangling the counterfactual perspective. Here, the comparisons with Turks in Turkey suggest that the migration project has mixed results. The second generation is more successful than its Turkish counterparts in terms of educational achievements. This is mainly driven by their lower dependence on parental education, as expected form *hypothesis 2a*, which leads Turks from low class backgrounds (the majority in Western Europe) to achieve higher education status in Western Europe than in Turkey. Regarding the results on occupation, we observed that, on average, second generation Turks are doing better compared to the first generation and also compared to Turks in Turkey. However, the advantage with respect to those left behind reverses once education is taken into account. In particular, it is the different average value that education has in Western European and Turkish labour markets what has driven this result; for women this was even amplified by the existence of higher returns to education in Turkey (note that we did not find strong evidence for a lower parental direct effect on occupation, as stated in *hypothesis 2b*). Therefore, even though second generation Turks do not suffer 'ethnic penalties' in their majority, they still cannot reach the same occupational levels as their counterparts back home. Note that with regard to the results on 'ethnic penalties' our study refutes previous findings (Heath and Cheung 2007): it is actually the effect of the class of origin (in terms of different group compositions) what helps explaining them (see footnote #8).

Was migration beneficial for Turks then? There is probably not a concluding answer for this question, but we are inclined to say yes. The possibility of acquiring a relatively higher education among the children of low class Turkish migrants – and the possibility to fairly converting these in the labour market – is, per se, a positive outcome. Although in Turkey on equality of parental occupation and education, the occupational status is higher on average (in particular for highly educated women), the possibility that a child with low class backgrounds reaches a higher occupational status through education – which differentiates him/her from parents – is more unlikely. On the other hand, among women there has also been a gain in terms of access to the labour market, much wider in Western Europe than in Turkey.

We expect this approach serves as a starting point for further research on other aspects of integration, so as to have a better and more complete understanding of the penalties and benefits linked to migration.

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TABLES

Table 1: Hypotheses, mechanisms and comparison with Turks in Turkey				
Generation	Outcome	Hypothesis	Mechanisms	Comparison with Turks in Turkey
First	Occupation	*1.* Lower dependence on parental background (OD) and lower returns to education (ED) compared to Turkish and Western European natives	1st generation Turks leave their parents behind; their education is not recognized in the destination country	Lower dependence on low parental backgrounds can give an advantage to Turks in Western Europe; while not being able to transfer the own education into matching occupations might lead to the opposite. This, however, will depend on the value of education in Turkish and Western European labour markets and on the presence of 'ethnic penalties'.
Second	Education	*2.a.* Lower dependence on parental background (OE) compared to Turkish and Western European natives	Motivation, higher aspirations among low background parents	Better outcomes compared to those left behind, thanks to upward educational mobility
	Occupation	*2.b.* Lower dependance on parental background (OD) compared to Turkish and Western European natives	Motivation, higher aspirations among low background parents	Lower dependence on low parental backgrounds can give an advantage to Turks in Western Europe. This advantage, however, will depend on the value of education in Turkish and Western European labour markets and on the presence of 'ethnic penalties'.

Table 2: Distribution of comparison groups by survey/round and country (%). Population 18-65*

	Turks in Turkey	Turk 1st	Turk 2nd	WE Natives
Survey/round				
ESS1	0.0	18.4	16.5	19.7
ESS2	29.4	18.8	19.9	19.0
ESS3	0.0	16.7	18.2	18.8
ESS4	35.3	17.5	15.2	15.4
ESS5	0.0	15.8	18.9	14.4
EVS	35.3	12.8	11.4	12.8
Country				
Austria	0.0	8.5	13.1	8.7
Belgium	0.0	9.4	10.4	10.2
Switzerland	0.0	18.4	10.1	8.8
Germany	0.0	26.9	36.0	16.5
Denmark	0.0	6.8	5.4	10.8
France	0.0	2.6	4.0	10.6
Netherlands	0.0	15.4	14.5	12.1
Norway	0.0	4.7	1.3	11.7
Sweden	0.0	7.3	5.1	10.7
Turkey	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	2,198	234	297	55,329

* The sample is restricted to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents' ISEI.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics by comparison group and gender (means and correlation coefficients)*

	Men				Women			
	Turks in Turkey	Turks 1st	Turks 2nd	WE Natives	Turks in Turkey	Turks 1st	Turks 2nd	WE Natives
Parents' education	6.4	7.9	9.2	11.6	6.2	8.5	8.7	11.5
Education	9.5	10.7	12.3	13.6	7.9	10.2	11.9	13.4
Parents' ISEI	30.8	34.3	33.8	43.7	33.1	33.6	32.4	43.5
ISEI	36.3	35.8	38.1	46.0	42.0	31.8	39.9	44.6
Age	39.1	41.2	31.1	43.4	34.9	39.3	29.5	43.5
Total 25-60	1,549	152	123	24,685	1,963	100	88	25,796
Total 18-60	1,540	154	170	27,273	658	80	127	28,050
*Total 18-60***	1,890	162	190	28,605	2,382	110	155	29,606

* Values for educational measures are calculated for people between 25 and 65 years old with valid parents' education and ISEI, while values for age and ISEI measures are calculated for people between 18 and 65 years old, with valid education and parents' ISEI (filters apply to totals as well).
** Total population with valid education and parents' ISEI (with and without an ISEI).

Table 4: Education (years) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), parents' education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age[1] (men and women 25-65). Models control for survey/round[2].

	Men			Women		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b
Constant	9.74	11.46	12.55	8.40	10.18	11.52
	(0.09)***	(0.09)***	(0.14)***	(0.08)***	(0.08)***	(0.13)***
Turks 1st	1.40	0.80	0.28	2.47	1.68	0.41
	(0.27)***	(0.24)***	(0.34)	(0.32)***	(0.29)***	(0.36)
Turks 2nd	2.77	2.00	0.40	3.70	3.11	1.98
	(0.30)***	(0.27)***	(0.32)	(0.34)***	(0.31)***	(0.37)***
WE Natives	4.45	2.25	1.14	6.07	3.91	2.57
	(0.09)***	(0.08)***	(0.14)***	(0.08)***	(0.08)***	(0.13)***
PEDUC		1.30	2.23		1.24	2.31
		(0.02)***	(0.09)***		(0.02)***	(0.09)***
Turk 1st * PEDUC			-0.23			-0.98
			(0.27)			(0.28)***
Turk 2nd * PEDUC			-1.91			-0.74
			(0.28)***			(0.31)**
WE Natives * PEDUC			-0.97			-1.13
			(0.10)***			(0.09)***
PISEI	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.44	0.40
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Age	-0.04	-0.00	-0.00	-0.07	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.00)***	(0.00)**	(0.00)**	(0.00)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.36	0.37
N	26,509	26,509	26,509	27,947	27,947	27,947

[1] The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. Peduc and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 35. *** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10

[2] The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS.

Table 5: Occupation (ISEI) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age[1] (men and women 18-65). Models control for survey/round[2].

	Men				Women			
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b
Constant	35.63	45.42	40.52	44.34	41.76	47.94	45.45	48.08
	(0.46)***	(0.40)***	(0.59)***	(0.55)***	(0.65)***	(0.56)***	(0.76)***	(0.70)***
Turk 1st	-0.52	-3.57	-2.35	-4.32	-10.21	-11.03	-11.26	-13.05
	(1.38)	(1.16)***	(1.55)	(1.49)***	(1.89)***	(1.63)***	(2.15)***	(2.02)***
Turk 2nd	3.07	-2.05	0.40	-2.70	-2.08	-3.40	-3.32	-5.17
	(1.32)**	(1.11)*	(1.59)	(1.45)*	(1.55)	(1.33)**	(1.98)*	(1.82)***
WE Natives	9.36	-2.65	4.10	-1.60	2.83	-5.83	-0.88	-5.95
	(0.44)***	(0.39)***	(0.57)***	(0.54)***	(0.64)***	(0.56)***	(0.75)	(0.69)***
PISEI		3.21	6.19	2.34		2.57	5.10	1.11
		(0.09)***	(0.50)***	(0.47)***		(0.09)***	(0.69)***	(0.65)*
Turk 1st * PISEI			-0.76	2.04			-1.51	0.28
			(1.44)	(1.30)			(1.96)	(1.87)
Turk 2nd * PISEI			-4.12	-1.11			-3.21	-0.20
			(1.63)**	(1.46)			(2.00)	(1.82)
WE Natives * PISEI			-0.68	0.89			-0.39	1.50
			(0.51)	(0.48)*			(0.70)	(0.66)**
EDUC		8.34		7.89		7.76		9.54
		(0.09)***		(0.33)***		(0.09)***		(0.46)***
Turk 1st * EDUC				-3.29				-3.88
				(1.04)***				(1.61)**
Turk 2nd * EDUC				-1.51				-3.41
				(1.39)				(1.44)**
WE Natives * EDUC				0.55				-1.83
				(0.34)				(0.47)***
Age	0.13	0.21	0.22	0.21	-0.01	0.11	0.06	0.11

	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
Adj. R[2]	0.03	0.32	0.13	0.32	0.00	0.26	0.08	0.26
N	29,137	29,137	29,137	29,137	28,915	28,915	28,915	28,915

1 The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. EDUC and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 35.
*** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10.
[2] The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS.

FIGURES

Figure 1: The OED model and its relationship with groups (G)

a.



b.



c.



Figure 2: Education by parents' education

Men



Women



Confidence intervals: p-value<.10

Figure 3: ISEI by parents' ISEI

Men



Women



Confidence intervals: p-value<.10

Figure 4: ISEI by education

Men



Women



Confidence intervals: p-value<.10