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Does it matter why immigrants came here? Original motives, the labour market, and national identity in the UK

Stuart Campbell¹

Abstract

The importance of the original motives for migration has often been asserted in the economics of migration literature, but direct measures of such motives have seldom been included in empirical models of immigrant outcomes. For the first time, I am able to directly identify work, student, family, and refugee immigrants in a large UK survey dataset. Using a sample of immigrants who have been in the country for at least five years, I show that original motives are strong predictors of employment, wages, and uptake of the native national identity. On employment and wages, I find that those who originally came as work or student immigrants are the most successful, while family immigrants do less well, and refugees fare the worst. On national identity, I find that those who originally came as refugees and family immigrants are the most likely to identify as British, while work and student immigrants are the least. My results provide new support for the predictions of the human capital model of migration in both the economic and cultural spheres, as well as for the recent 'cultural distance' model of national identity proposed by Manning and Roy. I suggest that the flexibility of the British national concept may usefully support multiculturalism, but that the pursuit of such abstract national adherence should not detract from efforts to cultivate social and economic inclusion among immigrants.

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1. Introduction

The importance of the original motives for migration is often asserted in the economics of migration literature, and rightly so. Such motives drive the process of self-selection, which differentiates those who migrate from those who do not on a collection of influential characteristics. Among those who do migrate, original motives can also inform us about a set of related factors that shape social and economic experiences in the host country. Yet direct measures of motives have seldom been included in empirical models comparing immigrants' behaviour. Our analysis of immigrant outcomes is therefore missing something fundamental.

A standard assertion is that those who migrated for employment purposes are positively self-selected on labour market ability and motivation (see, for example, Chiswick, 1999: 184). This is an intuitive implication of the human capital analysis of the decision to move: migration is a costly investment with uncertain returns, and as such it makes sense only for those most able to capitalise via the labour market.² However, not every migrant is *homo economicus*. Employment is not always the prime motive for migration, and in some countries a majority of immigrants arrive with other expressed intentions.³

What might we expect of those who migrated for non-work reasons? Although the human capital approach leads us to anticipate that they will be less favourably self-selected on labour market characteristics, we do not know exactly how different types of non-work immigrant will compare, or the scale of the differences between motive groups. Those driven by non-work motives may bring other qualities that aid or hinder them on the labour market, and may face other constraints. For example, they may have different degrees of access to family and social networks, different aspirations for acquiring local qualifications or the host language, and different intentions regarding integration or return migration. They may also face different legal restrictions on arrival. Any of these factors could produce variation in labour

² Borjas (1987) notes that the relative income distributions of the sending and receiving countries also affect the immigrant self-selection process. See Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2013: 81-88) for a recent summary of the long-running debate between Chiswick and Borjas on immigrant selectivity.

³ In the UK, nearly two thirds of long-term immigrants arriving in the year ending December 2013 came for non-work related reasons, according to Long Term International Migration data (ONS, 2014d).

market performance, and hence have an important influence on the economic lives of immigrants. In the first part of this paper, I examine the employment and wage implications of different original motives for work, student, family, and refugee immigrants who have settled in the UK.

A less frequently noted implication of the human capital analysis is that work immigrants will be favourably self-selected on cultural adaptability: the costs of migration are reduced by an enhanced capacity to adapt to the host culture, and migration is more likely to be a viable investment for those who can adapt more readily.⁴ Non-work immigrants will be less favourably self-selected on this trait. However, as with labour market ability and motivation, the variation in cultural adaptability between non-work immigrant groups and the scale of the differences is uncertain.

Cultural adaptability is more difficult to infer from survey data than labour market talent, but one useful indicator is suggested by the recent work of Manning and Roy (2010: F94-F96). Their ‘cultural distance’ model implies that we can observe cultural adaptability through variation in uptake of the native national identity. With other factors held equal, the least culturally adaptable immigrants are the most likely to adopt the native national identity: for them, it is a way to feel part of the host society in the absence of strong behavioural affinities. In the second part of this paper, I examine this hypothesis through uptake of the British national identity by different motive groups who have settled in the UK.⁵

As well as revealing the significance of original motives, both the labour market performance and the national affiliations of immigrants are matters of substantial public and policy interest in themselves. Labour market performance determines the fiscal and labour market effects of immigration from the host country’s perspective, and these have been the subject of a charged academic and policy debate in recent

⁴ These are equivalent to what Sjaastad (1962: 84-85) and Chiswick (1978: 900n) call the ‘psychic costs’ of migration.

⁵ There is also an economics of identity (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), but the significance of national identity for economic outcomes has not been firmly established (Dustmann, 1996; Manning and Roy, 2010: F77; Casey and Dustmann, 2010). The related concept of ethnic identity does appear to be associated with labour market outcomes (Battu *et al.*, 2007; Battu and Zenou, 2010; Nekby and Rodin, 2007; Pendakur and Pendakur, 2005).

years (see Manacorda *et al.*, 2012; Dustmann and Frattini, 2013; Devlin *et al.*, 2014). National identity serves an important unifying function in multicultural societies, and the national identities of immigrants have been a topic of enduring public and political fascination in the UK in particular (see the discussions in Manning and Roy, 2010: F73-F74; Nandi and Platt, 2013: 3-6). Indeed, politicians from all three major political parties in the UK have been keen to promote the benign civic nationalism associated with simple identification as ‘British’ (see Uberoi and Modood, 2013).

My results show that original motives are important predictors of labour market outcomes and national identity among immigrants in the UK. I examine only ‘settled’ immigrants, who I define as those who have been in the UK for at least five years. On the labour market, I find that those who originally came as work or student immigrants have the highest employment propensities, and that they also earn the highest wages of the different motive groups. Male family immigrants have similarly high employment propensities, but earn much less. Female family immigrants and refugees do not do as well on the labour market, having low employment propensities, and low wages. These differences remain after accounting for variation in country of origin, time spent in the UK, and other relevant demographic and human capital characteristics. This ranking of work, student, family and refugee immigrants on labour market performance is broadly consistent with expectations based on the human capital model of migration. I investigate use of networks in job search and language ability as possible mechanisms, but find that they explain only a modest proportion of the differences between the motive groups.

On national identity, using the same sample of settled immigrants in the UK, I find that refugee and family immigrants are the most likely to identify as British, and that work and student immigrants are the least so. These differences remain after accounting comprehensively for country of origin and other relevant factors, though country of origin remains an important determinant. This is in line with differential self-selection on cultural adaptability, and the ‘cultural distance’ model of national identity. I suggest that these results are consistent with a well-functioning, culturally-inclusive British national identity.

This paper advances the literature in three ways: first, it provides new support for the predictions of the human capital analysis of migration, not only in the economic sphere, but also in the cultural lives of immigrants. Second, it provides support for Manning and Roy's 'cultural distance' model of national identity, a recent theory in a relatively new area of economic research. Finally, it examines all four major migrant motives: not only work immigrants, who are the focus of an established literature in economics, but also family, student, and refugee immigrants. Family immigrants and refugees have been the subject of some social scientific research, but they remain understudied in economics.⁶ Student immigrants who go on to settle in the host country have largely been neglected in the scholarly literature, despite their increasing importance for large exporters of international education such as the UK.⁷ Crucially, I provide estimates of the scale of the conditional differences between these motive groups, as well as the direction.

These contributions are enhanced by two features of the data:⁸ first, the data allow the construction of a large, multinational sample of immigrants, in a relatively large immigrant receiving country. Second, they contain a direct survey measure of original motives, rather than records of visa category, so the mechanism behind self-selection can be explicitly addressed.⁹

The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I describe the data and key variables, and in Section 3 I assess the relationship between original motives and labour market outcomes. In Section 4 I address the relationship between original motives and national identity, and in Section 5 I conclude.

⁶ Family immigrants are studied by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995), Husted *et al.* (2001), Constant and Zimmerman (2006), Aydemir (2011), and Bevelander and Pendakur (2014). Refugees are studied by Cortes (2004), Bevelander and Pendakur (2014), Lamba (2003) and Bloch (2008).

⁷ Bratsberg (1995) and Rosenzweig (2008) are the only large-scale studies of 'student stayers' of which I am aware.

⁸ Jayaweera (2013) and Cooper *et al.* (2014) present non-technical reports related to original motives using the same survey data.

⁹ Studies using data on visa category include Husted *et al.* (2001) on Denmark; Aydemir (2011) on Canada; Bevelander and Pendakur (2014) on Canada and Sweden; Constant and Zimmerman (2005) and Constant and Zimmerman (2006) on Denmark and Germany.

2. Data

2.1 How do we know about immigrants' original motives, labour market outcomes, and national identity?

The data I use in this study come from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) over 2010-2014.¹⁰ This is the largest regular household survey in the UK, covering approximately 40,000 households per calendar quarter. The LFS has a rotating panel design, and follows each household for five successive quarters, although in this paper I use only individual-level information, and only one observation per individual.

Since the first quarter of 2010, a new question in the LFS has sought to identify the main reason that originally led foreign-born adults to migrate to the UK.¹¹ Respondents may give any of the following reasons:

1. *For employment*
2. *For study*
3. *To get married or form a civil partnership in the UK*
4. *As a spouse or dependent of a UK citizen or settled person*
5. *As a spouse or dependent of someone coming into the UK for work or study reasons or as a spouse or dependent of someone already in the UK*
6. *Seeking asylum*
7. *As a visitor*
8. *Other reasons*

I use the responses to this question to classify the original motives of immigrants.

For the purposes of this paper, it is useful that the question captures expressed motives, rather than visa category. Visa category gives a clear indication of the legal environment faced by an immigrant, and can also provide clues as to her unobserved

¹⁰ For a recent discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the LFS for studying immigrants, see Campbell (2013: 13-14).

¹¹ This variable is currently only available on the ONS and Government Statistical Service versions of the LFS. Access to academic researchers is available via the UK Data Service Secure Lab, though currently only up to the end of 2013 (ONS, 2014e). Questions and responses are from ONS (2014b).

characteristics, but it is underlying motives that drive the immigrant self-selection process. It is also useful that the question allows the identification of immigrants with different motives who came from the same country and arrived at the same time. Several authors have used country of origin and year of arrival to indirectly infer refugee and economic immigrant status (Lindley, 2002; Edin *et al.*, 2003; Cortes, 2004; Kausar and Drinkwater, 2010), but this strategy has the potential to produce a large amount of measurement error in some countries, since immigrants arriving from the same country at the same time do not always have the same original motives (Bell *et al.*, 2013, make this point in relation to refugees in the UK).

Some respondents may not give their true original intentions. This may be due either to accidental or deliberate misreporting, and I will discuss the potential impact of this kind of measurement error when estimating empirical models below. Respondents can also chose only one answer, when of course migration may be driven by a set of factors.¹² This reduces a potentially complex and multifaceted migration decision to a single-answer, multiple choice question. My analysis is therefore likely to simplify the role of motives somewhat, though this weakness seems unavoidable.¹³

To assess labour market performance, I use information on both employment and wages.¹⁴ The LFS is designed to collect information on employment according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition, and my use of the term therefore corresponds to this. The wage component of my analysis is based on a subsample: questions on wages in the LFS are only asked to employees (not the self-employed), and only to those interviewed in Waves 1 or 5. I use the ‘average gross hourly pay’ variable, which is calculated from the gross weekly pay reported by the respondent in their main job in the week ending the previous Sunday. This value is divided by their reported usual hours of regular work plus their usual paid overtime to produce the average hourly pay figure. Comparison with administrative sources suggests that the LFS tends to underestimate wages (see Fry and Ritchie, 2012, for a recent discussion of measurement error in the LFS wage estimates). I exclude those who report earning

¹² See, for example, Gonzalez-Ferrer (2010), on the connections between work and family migration.

¹³ See Luthra *et al.* (2014) for a study on recent EU immigrants from Poland, which uses a more detailed measure of original motives.

¹⁴ For descriptions of occupational distribution and skill-level by original motive, see Cooper *et al.* (2014).

more than £99 per hour, in line with the recommendations of the data provider (ONS, 2014c: 299), and do not include any zero values.

The information I use on national identity comes from a question that has been included in the LFS since 2001. All adults (both native and foreign-born) are asked the question:

*How would you describe your national identity? Please choose all that apply*¹⁵

Respondents are asked to choose from a list of the constituent nationalities of the UK ('English', 'Scottish', 'Welsh', and 'Northern Irish'), and additional categories for 'British' and 'Other'. I group respondents who report a British national identity with those who report any of the constituent national identities of Britain.¹⁶ A proportion of respondents report multiple national identities: if one or more of those reported is British, then I also classify them as holding a British national identity, although I do also show the small proportion with 'mixed' British and foreign national identities in Section 4.2 below.¹⁷ Respondents resident in Northern Ireland were not asked about their national identity until 2011, so the number of respondents from this part of the UK is slightly smaller than it would otherwise be.¹⁸

I cannot account for different respondents interpreting the national identity question in different ways: indeed, there could be substantial variation in what individuals understand by 'national identity'. Much has been written on the social-psychological meaning of national identity (see, for example, Cinnirella, 1997; Kelman *et al.*, 1997; Esses *et al.*, 2001), but I do not seek to contribute to this literature. For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to accept that variation in the uptake of a native national

¹⁵ Before 2011, the question was worded slightly differently: *What do you consider your national identity to be? Please choose as many as apply* (ONS, 2010).

¹⁶ I do not address the relationship between British national identity and its constituent identities here, though it is extremely topical. See Nandi and Platt (2013) for recent empirical evidence that ethnic minorities feel more British than the ethnic majority, who tend to identify with their own country within the UK.

¹⁷ The view from sociology is that assimilation into the host identity and out of home identity are two distinct processes (see the discussion in Nandi and Platt, 2013: 25-26). The results here are similar with or without including those with a 'mixed' national identity as British.

¹⁸ Respondents resident in Northern Ireland are also given the additional option of declaring an 'Irish' national identity, which I classify as 'foreign', in contrast to a 'Northern Irish' identity, which I classify as 'British'. Northern Ireland is not strictly part of Britain, but I include this identity as British, as the country is a constituent part of the UK.

identity can inform us about the cultural characteristics of immigrants. This understanding of national identity is most explicitly promoted by Manning and Roy (2010), but it is also consistent with the theory and evidence elsewhere in the emerging economics of identity literature (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Battu *et al.*, 2007; Georgiadis and Manning, 2013).

Several authors have warned that the LFS question on national identity might be interpreted by respondents as a question about citizenship (Nandi and Platt, 2013: 5; Manning and Roy, 2010: F75; Georgiadis and Manning, 2013: 170), and there is a large over-lap between responses to the citizenship and identity questions in my analytical sample (around 80% of immigrants who are British citizens report a British national identity). I take account of this in robustness checks below, and find that controls for citizenship do attenuate my estimates of the association between original motives and national identity, although sizable and statistically significant differences remain. In defence of the survey question, empirical results in the UK have been broadly consistent regardless of the exact question on national identity (as noted by Platt, 2013: 9). It may also be the case that for some immigrants, legal citizenship facilitates the adoption of a British national identity in some psychological sense, as is suggested by the refugees interviewed in Stewart and Mulvey (2011: 60-62). These authors note a perceived “...need for official recognition of identity construction”. This would imply that legal citizenship is a mechanism explaining uptake of the native national identity, as well as something potentially confounded with it.

The inclusion of questions on labour market outcomes, original motives, and national identity, alongside information on a large set of demographic and human capital characteristics, make the LFS uniquely appropriate for this investigation. The large sample of immigrants in the survey is also useful for purposes of statistical inference.

2.2 Who is included in the analytical sample?

Most importantly, I focus on ‘settled’ immigrants, and exclude anyone who has been in the country for less than five years, thus reducing the final analytical sample size by

just over 20%.¹⁹ This step is necessary in order to remove short-term immigrants, who are likely to have quite distinct labour market characteristics and feelings of national affiliation, and are therefore not representative of the immigrants that go on to settle in the UK. I also restrict the sample to people who are aged between 21 and 65, and who arrived in the UK aged 16 or over. After these restrictions are applied, I have a full set of observations on labour market status, but I exclude those on whom I do not have national identity information (less than 2% of the total).

Table A1 in the Appendix compares the labour market characteristics of ‘recent’ immigrants (those who are within five years of arrival) with ‘settled’ immigrants (those who have been in the country for five years or longer). Recent student immigrants and refugees have particularly distinct characteristics, with, for example, fewer than 40% of male student immigrants employed, and around 25% of male refugees. These low proportions will partly be due to students being in full-time study, and to refugees being legally excluded from the labour market (see my discussion of refugees and asylum seekers below). My removal of those immigrants who are in their first five years therefore allows for a fairer comparison of outcomes between the motive groups. As would be expected, immigrants in their first five years are also unlikely to report a British national identity: around 4% of men and around 5% of women do so. Such early adoption of a British identity among immigrants may reflect existing family connections to the UK. The five year cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, but coincides both with the residency requirement for those applying for permanent leave to remain in the UK, and for those who wish to acquire UK citizenship. The five year exclusion will have an impact on the sample via a selected outflow of different kinds of immigrant, which I discuss further below.

I use one observation per individual, and expand the number of individuals in the sample by allowing this observation to come from any of the five waves of the LFS.²⁰ I prioritise observations that appear in Wave 1, and then those that appear in Wave 5 of the survey, as these are the two waves of the LFS which contain wage information. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the ‘wave origins’ of the sample, demonstrating that

¹⁹ Cooper *et al.* (2014) present demographic and labour market information by motive from the same dataset, using population weights, and without the sample restrictions I have applied here.

²⁰ I use the sample-expansion method described in Campbell (2013:17-18).

the number of sampled individuals is increased by around 55% by drawing observations from all waves of the survey, compared to using the first wave alone.

Table 1 shows the composition of the sample by motive and gender, after these restrictions have been applied.

Table 1: Sample by motive and gender, column %

Motive	Men	Women	Total
Employment	43.1	26.0	33.7
Study	18.2	14.7	16.3
To get married/form a civil partnership	5.3	11.4	8.7
As a spouse/dep. of a UK citizen	7.8	17.2	13.0
As a spouse/dep. of someone coming to UK	4.5	13.2	9.3
Seeking asylum	9.1	5.3	7.0
As a visitor	3.4	4.4	3.9
Other reason	6.9	6.2	6.5
Missing/No answer	1.7	1.5	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the initial sample by original motive and gender. The sample consists of 12,686 men and 15,626 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK aged 16 or older, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=28,312.

This initial sample contains over 28 thousand immigrants. The largest motive group overall is immigrants who came for employment purposes, who make up just over a third of the sample. The next largest groups are those who came as student immigrants, and those who came as a spouse or dependent of a UK citizen, who each make up around a sixth of the sample. The biggest difference by gender is that a smaller proportion of women than men came seeking employment (26%, compared to 43% of men), and that a larger proportion of women than men came for one of the three family-related reasons ('To get married/form a civil partnership'; 'As a spouse/dependent of a UK citizen'; and 'As a spouse/dependent of someone coming to UK') (around 42%, compared to 18% of men).

I refer to those who say that they came for employment purposes as 'Work' immigrants, those who originally came to study as 'Student' immigrants, and those who came to seek asylum as 'Refugees'. Given that all the family-related motives suggest the decision to come to the UK was dependent on partners or relatives, I merge these three groups and call them all 'Family' immigrants. I discard those who

gave the responses ‘As a visitor’ or ‘Other reason’, and thereby lose around 10% of the sample. I do so because those who give these responses are likely to be a very heterogeneous group. I also discard those who give no answer (under 2% of the total). This leaves me with four categories of immigrant: ‘Work’, ‘Student’, ‘Family’ and ‘Refugee’. The sample is thus reduced to 24,894 respondents, of whom I have wage information on 9,417. I conduct most of the analysis in this paper using this sample and subsample.

It may be helpful to clarify the legal distinction between an ‘Asylum seeker’ and a ‘Refugee’ in the UK: as I noted above, it is expressed motive rather than legal category that is of most interest for this paper, but in the case of refugees, legal status makes an important difference in regard to the labour market. An ‘Asylum seeker’ is someone who arrived in the country independently, and has applied to remain in the country for humanitarian protection. Asylum seekers are not usually allowed to work in the UK, or to claim government welfare benefits, though they are sometimes eligible to receive state support (see Home Office, 2014a).²¹ Since 1999, ‘Asylum seekers’ have also been subject to compulsory geographical dispersal in the UK.²² A ‘Refugee’ is someone who has either arrived as part of a refugee resettlement programme, and has therefore been recognised as a refugee by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or is a previous asylum seeker, who has been recognised as a refugee by the UK government. Refugees are allowed to work and claim benefits in the UK. The majority of refugees in the sample will have been granted indefinite leave to remain in the country.²³

I call all immigrants who report having come to the UK to seek asylum ‘Refugees’. This may include a proportion who are legally ‘Asylum seekers’, but I do not use the term in a strict legal sense. Given that I have excluded anyone in their first five years in the country, the proportion who are legally ‘Asylum seekers’ is likely to be

²¹ Non-EU student and family immigrants also typically face some initial restrictions on their employment rights or access to benefits, although neither group are restricted as completely or for as long as asylum seekers.

²² For a discussion of the modern history of dispersal in the UK, see Bloch and Schuster (2005).

²³ Since August 2005, refugee status has been granted only for five years, with the expectation of a review at the end of that period (this does not apply to refugees who have been resettled by the UNHCR) (Home Office, 2005). Since those in the sample were interviewed over 2010-2014, and those who have been in the country for less than five years are excluded, most in the sample will not have been affected by this change.

relatively small: Cebulla *et al.* (2010) report that between 2005-2007, around a fifth of asylum seekers had been in the country for five or more years at the time of the decision on their legal status. Further, as the Office for National Statistics (2007) point out, some asylum seekers live in communal accommodation that is not covered by the LFS, while those who live in eligible households may be affected by communication barriers or reluctance to take part in government surveys more than other immigrant groups.

2.3 Who is most likely to leave the country?

The sample I use is drawn from the immigrant ‘stock’ in the UK. I am only able to observe outcomes for those immigrants who have stayed in the country, and I wilfully exclude those who have stayed for less than five years. Many immigrants will return to their home countries over time, and some will move on to different countries after a period in the UK. This process will be non-random, and so the immigrant stock I observe will be selected on outflow as well as on inflow. There is no comprehensive data-source on the rates of immigrant outflow by original motive, but for immigrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), it is possible to make some inferences about outflows by legal migration category from administrative data on entry visas and subsequent changes or extensions to these visas.

The UK government has published a series of reports which examine the legal trajectories of non-EEA immigrants by original visa category (Achato *et al.*, 2010; Achato *et al.*, 2011; Home Office, 2013; Home Office, 2014b). For example, in the 2014 report, which examines a cohort of immigrants who arrived in 2007, the authors find that around 33% of those with skilled-work visas remain legally in the country after five years, compared to 7% of those with temporary work visas, two thirds of those with family visas, and 15% of those with student visas (the figures are similar for other cohorts). These figures can be regarded as lower-bounds, since it is not possible to account for those who over-stay their visas illegally, but at least the visa information gives a sense of the relative outflow rates for non-EEA immigrants in the

first five years: family immigrants are the most likely to stay,²⁴ while student immigrants are the least likely. There is heterogeneity among work immigrants, some of whom have only temporary visas and are unlikely to stay, while the more skilled are more likely to stay. There are no equivalent data on outflow of refugees, but some who are still legal ‘Asylum seekers’ will have to leave the country if their application for refugee status eventually fails. However, once legal status has been granted, refugees seem likely to stay on in the country for a substantial period of time, since, by definition, a return to the home country is difficult or impossible (Cortes, 2004, makes this argument in relation to refugees in the USA).

For EEA immigrants, there is no comparable information available on outflow by visa category, since visas are not required to migrate within the EEA. The Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) survey data (ONS, 2014d) do cover the motive for *emigration* of EEA immigrants leaving the UK, but this does not necessarily bare any relation to the original motive for migration. For example, someone who came to the UK for employment purposes could just as easily leave the country for family reasons. In general, we might expect the outflow of EEA immigrants by motive to be similar to that of non-EEA immigrants: family immigrants are less likely to want to leave, while work and student immigrants are more likely.²⁵ The lower travel and administrative costs of migration within the EEA imply that both inflows and outflows of EEA immigrants will be greater and less selected in general (see the discussion on European migration costs and selection in Campbell, 2013: 10-11).

3. Do original motives matter for employment and wages?

3.1 How might original motives matter for employment and wages?

Work immigrants should outperform other motive groups on the labour market, once observed demographic and human characteristics have been accounted for. This follows from the most straightforward human capital analysis of migration, the logic of which dictates that people with stronger labour market characteristics from the

²⁴ See Bijwaard and van Doeselaar (2014) for evidence on the role of divorce and remarriage on the propensity for return migration among family immigrants in the Netherlands.

²⁵ There are a few immigrants in the sample from inside the EU who arrived as refugees, all of whom will have arrived during World War II, or the communist era that followed.

population of a home country will find migration a more profitable enterprise, and will therefore have a higher propensity to migrate. Further, for a move to be profitable, those who face higher direct costs of migration must be more favourably self-selected than others, and have a lower propensity to return to their origin country (see Chiswick, 1999: 181-182).²⁶ By this reasoning, work immigrants will be the most favourably self-selected group on inflow, and the favourable characteristics of the stock are likely to be intensified by the relatively high outflow I have noted in the visa data cited above. Such characteristics would be reflected in a higher employment propensity and higher wages than other motive groups.

Student immigrants who settle in the UK are likely to be more heterogeneous in their labour market abilities than work immigrants, since work is not the explicit motive for migration. However, like work immigrants, students migrate of their own volition, and many of those who stay will have had post-study work in mind when they migrated, which makes the same positive self-selection mechanisms at least partly applicable. To the extent that more education tends to be accumulated by the more able, we can expect the gap in labour market ability between student and work immigrants to be attenuated. However, the high rate of outflow in this group makes it difficult to form expectations about the characteristics of the remaining stock. Those who took the prospect of remaining in the country into account when migrating are likely to be similar to work immigrants in their characteristics. Others will have stayed on after studying for more idiosyncratic reasons, such as to get married or to gain experience living abroad, and therefore give less reason to expect unusual labour market talent.²⁷ The net effect of the immigrant outflow on the characteristics of the student immigrant stock is therefore ambiguous.

Family immigrants are likely to perform less well on the labour market than either work or student immigrants. The self-selection mechanism will be weaker in this group, since the migration decision was dependent on partners or relatives, and priorities of family immigrants in the host country are less likely to revolve around work. In particular, female family immigrants may be more engaged with family

²⁶ On the selectivity of return migration, also see Constant and Massey (2002), Dustmann and Weiss (2007) and Dustmann *et al.* (2011).

²⁷ See Bijwaard and Wang (2014) for recent evidence on the factors which induce student immigrants to stay on in the Netherlands.

activity and less likely to participate in the labour market (Reimers, 1985; Duleep and Sanders, 1993; Cobb-Clark and Connolly 2001). However, several authors have noted that family immigrants are likely to have an information advantage over other types of migrant: family networks already in the host country can provide information about the host society and labour market that may be unavailable to other types of immigrant (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1995: 86; Aydemir, 2011: 453). The existing empirical evidence suggests that such networks tend to improve employment prospects by aiding job search, though they may result in lower quality employment (Battu *et al.* 2011). We may therefore expect to see family immigrants earning lower wages than work or student immigrants.

I expect refugees to have the worst labour market experiences of any motive group, since they have several factors acting against them: the self-selection mechanism will be weakest in this group, since migration is essentially forced. There is no reason why priorities in the host country should revolve around work, and many members of this group would have been excluded from the labour market for some period on arrival in country, since, as I noted above, asylum seekers are not usually allowed to work until refugee status has been granted. Bloch (2008) suggests that this legal exclusion could produce labour market scarring effects. The low proportion of settled refugees who will leave the country means that the average ability of the stock will not be improved by a negatively selected outflow. There is some evidence that refugees make extensive use of family and social networks when seeking work, but that, as with family immigrants, this may lead to lower quality employment (Bloch, 2008; Cebulla *et al.*, 2010). Several authors have also suggested that refugees face a particularly high level of labour market discrimination (Husted *et al.*, 2001: 59; Lamba, 2003: 46; Bloch, 2008: 31).

3.2 Are there any differences in employment and wages by original motive?

I show the proportion of immigrants employed, unemployed, and inactive in Table 2, along with median hourly wages, by gender and original motive.²⁸ In order to get a more detailed picture of the factors driving non-employment, I split economic

²⁸ Wages are adjusted monthly for inflation using the Consumer Prices Index (ONS, 2014a), with January 2010 as the reference month.

inactivity into four categories: those inactive for reasons relating to study, those having family or home responsibilities, those inactive due to poor health or disability, and those inactive for other reasons.²⁹ The total figures for the immigrant sample broadly correspond with those reported in other studies (for example, Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005; Algan *et al.* 2010).

Table 2: Labour market status and median wages, by original motive and gender, column % and £ per hour

	Motive				Total
	Work	Student	Family	Refugee	
Men					
Employee	69.8	70.0	61.1	48.4	65.9
Self-employed	18.8	13.9	20.1	16.2	17.8
Unemployed	4.0	5.2	6.2	13.8	5.7
Inactive (study)	0.3	5.4	1.0	1.4	1.6
Inactive (home-maker)	0.8	0.6	1.7	2.1	1.1
Inactive (health/disab.)	3.8	1.9	6.4	11.8	4.7
Inactive (other)	2.6	3.0	3.4	6.3	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median hourly wage (£)	10.0	13.7	8.0	6.7	9.8
Women					
Employee	72.1	64.6	41.7	27.3	53.7
Self-employed	8.3	8.5	5.9	2.9	6.9
Unemployed	3.9	4.8	5.4	10.7	5.2
Inactive (study)	0.8	6.1	1.5	4.8	2.3
Inactive (home-maker)	8.9	9.2	31.8	34.6	21.4
Inactive (health/disab.)	1.9	1.5	5.6	12.6	4.3
Inactive (other)	4.0	5.4	8.0	7.2	6.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median hourly wage (£)	9.5	11.9	8.0	6.5	9.2

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the proportion of the sample with each labour market status, and median hourly wages (at January 2010 prices), by original motive and gender. The ‘labour market status’ sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894. The ‘median hourly wages’ subsample consists of 4,576 men and 4,841 women who were interviewed in Waves 1 or 5 of the LFS, are employees, and provided wage information. n=9,417.

Within the sample of male immigrants, over-all employment and wages are highest among those who migrated for work, with 89% either employed or self-employed, and a median hourly wage of £10. Male student immigrants have similarly high over-all employment rates, and the highest median hourly wages, at just under £14. Male family immigrants are paid much less than work or student immigrants on average, at

²⁹ Note that some respondents who are economically inactive for each of these reasons do express a desire to work, but are not currently actively searching, so do not meet the ILO criteria for ‘unemployed’.

£8 per hour, although they have similar overall employment rates. Male refugees have the lowest wages, at under £7, and a particularly high rate of unemployment (at nearly 14%, compared to a sample average of 6%). Among UK-born men in the same age range and time frame, 80% are employed or self-employed, 6% are unemployed, and the median hourly wage is £11.³⁰

Within the sample of female immigrants, over-all employment is again highest among work immigrants, with 80% either employed or self-employed, and median hourly wages are highest among student immigrants, at £12. Compared to the other motive groups, female family immigrants and refugees have much lower rates of over-all employment (48% and 30% respectively), and much lower median hourly wages (£8 and £7). Among UK-born women in the same age range and time frame, 68% are employed or self-employed, 4% are unemployed, and the median hourly wage is £9.

It is worth noting that inactivity due to health problems or disability is particularly high among both male and female refugees, at 12% and 13% respectively, compared to sample averages of 5% and 4%. Bloch (2008) and Cebulla *et al.* (2010) also report poor health among refugees, and both argue that it may explain some of the employment difficulties faced by this group. Such health problems may be associated with the persecution of refugees in their home countries, or with adjustment difficulties after migration, though they are also consistent with lower selectivity on health (see Jasso *et al.*, 2004, for a discussion of immigrant selection on health, and heterogeneity in the ‘healthy immigrant effect’).³¹

3.3 Are these differences in employment and wages explained by other observed characteristics?

The differences apparent in Table 2 are broadly consistent with my prior expectations about the relationship between original motives, employment, and wages, but may also be explained by variation in other characteristics. Table A3 in the Appendix shows some of the relevant demographic and human capital characteristics. Age,

³⁰ I have drawn these figures from the same quarters of the LFS for purposes of comparison, but the UK-born do not feature in the main analytical sample.

³¹ There is a clinical literature on the health of refugees: see Burnett and Peel (2001) for a short review.

location, and qualifications are standard variables which affect labour market outcomes, and on which immigrants driven by different motives may differ. Given the factors apparently driving inactivity in Table 2, I show the proportion in full-time education, the proportion who are single or joint parents of dependent children, and the proportion who report health problems that affect either the type or amount of paid work they undertake. I also show the proportion of the sample from each international region of origin by motive. This regional information gives a broad approximation of the origins of people in the sample, but I will account for origins more comprehensively in the statistical models below. Of course, a person's geographic origins do not directly determine labour market outcomes, but they do proxy for various potentially influential characteristics, including ethnicity, religion, and speaking English as a first or second language. Table A3 also shows information on the average age at arrival, which I return to when discussing national identity in Section 4.

In Table A4 in the Appendix, I show distributional information on 'Years since migration' by motive (recalling that the sample contains no one who has been in the UK for fewer than five years). This is a crucial factor in immigrant labour market assimilation: a large literature in economics shows that labour market performance improves with years since migration, as country-specific skills are acquired, and skills attained abroad are adapted for the host environment (for example, Chiswick, 1978; LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Clark and Lindley, 2009).

The average characteristics of work immigrants are similar to those for the sample as a whole: aged around 41, a third in London, around 40% graduates, and in the country for an average of around 9 years. Student immigrants are better qualified than the average, as would be expected, and a greater proportion have been in the UK for longer than the other groups. Around 10% of both male and female student immigrants are in full-time education (this is a high proportion, recalling that none in the sample arrived in the last five years). Family immigrants are less well qualified but also tend to have been in the UK for longer than the other groups. More than a third of refugees have no qualifications, and they tend to have been in the UK for a shorter time. More than 15% of family immigrants are affected by work-impeding health problems, as are more than a quarter of refugees. Around half of work

immigrants come from either the A8 or the EU15 countries, while most family immigrants and refugees come from African or Asian countries.

Using these characteristics as control variables, alongside dummies for each original motive, I estimate binomial probit models of immigrant employment. Given gender differences in the determinants of employment, I estimate the models separately for men and women. The models take the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{prob}(\text{EMPLOYED}_i = 1) = \Phi (\alpha + \beta_1 \text{STUDENT}_i + \beta_2 \text{FAMILY}_i + \\
 \beta_3 \text{REFUGEE}_i + \beta_4 \text{YSM}_i + \beta_5 \text{STUDENT}_i * \text{YSM}_i + \beta_6 \text{FAMILY}_i * \text{YSM}_i + \\
 \beta_7 \text{REFUGEE}_i * \text{YSM}_i + \gamma X_i)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

where *EMPLOYED* is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if individual *i* is employed. *STUDENT*, *FAMILY*, and *REFUGEE* are dummy variables for each original motive group (with work immigrants acting as the reference group). I use a linear term for years since migration ('YSM') since I expect the process of employment assimilation to be approximately linear, after accounting for age effects. I also interact the YSM variable with each of the motive dummies, to allow trajectories of employment assimilation to vary by motive. I centre the interaction terms using the median of YSM for each group, so the motive dummies should be interpreted as the conditional association of the respective motive with employment, relative to work immigrants, at the median years since migration.

X represents a vector of the control variables discussed above, specifically: highest qualification (5 dummies in total: non-graduate, graduate, and postgraduate qualifications attained in the UK, and non-graduate and graduate qualifications attained abroad, with 'no qualifications' as the reference category), parental status (dummies for single parents and joint parents, with the childless acting as the reference group), location (a dummy for those that live in London), student status (a dummy for those that are full-time students), and health (a dummy for those with health problems affecting either the type or quantity of work they undertake). I include age and its square, to allow for employment to rise and then decline over the

lifecycle.³² Given the likely importance of factors relating to country of origin, I also include 36 origin dummies: 29 dummies for the most prevalent countries of origin in the data (which, when combined with the reference category, cover 75% of the sample), plus 6 dummies for country groups to cover the rest ('Other A8', 'Other Africa', 'Other Americas', 'Other Asia', 'Other EU15', 'Born elsewhere').³³ Poland, the modal origin country in the data, acts as the reference category. I also include year dummies to account for broader changes in the labour market over 2010-2014. The main parameter estimates of interest are β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 , which give the change in the probit index for employment associated with each original motive group, relative to work immigrants, conditional on the included control variables.

To assess how well employment is rewarded for immigrants with different original motives, I also estimate wage equations, including the same controls as above. As before, given gender differences in the determinants of wages, I estimate models separately for men and women. The wage equations take the form:

$$\ln(w_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 STUDENT_i + \beta_2 FAMILY_i + \beta_3 REFUGEE_i + \beta_4 YSM_i + \beta_5 STUDENT_i * YSM_i + \beta_6 FAMILY_i * YSM_i + \beta_7 REFUGEE_i * YSM_i + \gamma X_i + u_i \quad (2)$$

where w_i represents the wage of individual i , u_i is an error term, and the other variables are labelled as in equation (1). As with the employment models, I allow the wage trajectory to vary between groups by including interactions between each motive group and YSM (with these interactions centred as before). β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 therefore give the conditional association between each original motive and log wages, at the median years since migration, relative to work immigrants.

I have mentioned above that the self-reported motives of immigrants are likely to be measured with error. However, any such error seems unlikely to be random, particularly if some proportion of it is due to deliberate misreporting. For example, if

³² Age and YSM are highly correlated (0.74), but I include both since they have distinct implications for immigrants on the labour market.

³³ Full list of origin variables: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Lithuania, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United States, Zimbabwe, Other A8, Other Africa, Other Americas, Other Asia, Other EU15, Born elsewhere.

more favourable visa requirements lead a proportion of non-EU immigrants to report having been family immigrants when they really migrated primarily to work, then this error would have a systematic component. As such, it is difficult to judge the effect of the measurement error on my estimates.

Ideally, I would cluster standard errors at the household level, since the characteristics of immigrants within the same household are likely to be correlated. Unfortunately, although the LFS is a household survey, the available data do not allow individuals to be linked to households, making clustering at this level impossible: the standard errors I present are therefore likely to be underestimates.³⁴ Estimates that are near the conventional margins of statistical significance should be interpreted with caution. In the absence of an appropriate identifying instrument, I do not include controls for selection into employment in the wage equations.

The columns labelled ‘A’ in Table 3 show the key estimates from running models (1) and (2) with only controls for year. The columns labelled ‘B’ show the estimates after the full set of controls have been introduced. The coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, and the full results are presented in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix.

³⁴ It has not been possible to create a household identifier for the individual-level LFS data since the end of 2010. A household version of the LFS is available, but does not contain the full set of variables required for this analysis.

Table 3: Selected parameter estimates from models of employment and wages by gender

	Probit models of employment				Log wage equations			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Motives								
Work	(REF)							
Student	-21.9 (3.8)	-15.3 (5.6)	-24.2 (3.6)	-18.7 (4.5)	15.1 (2.3)	-4.1 (2.4)	14.7 (2.2)	-1.5 (2.3)
Family	-32.0 (3.8)	-24.3 (5.2)	-91.8 (2.7)	-53.9 (3.4)	-25.1 (2.4)	-26.9 (2.3)	-13.3 (1.9)	-17.2 (1.8)
Refugee	-83.0 (4.4)	-63.2 (6.4)	-137.8 (5.1)	-87.2 (6.6)	-46.4 (3.5)	-37.0 (3.9)	-29.9 (4.8)	-33.4 (4.9)
Years since migration								
YSM*10		-3.6 (3.2)		-17.7 (3.0)		2.3 (1.8)		5.2 (1.8)
Student*YSM*10		15.9 (4.1)		17.2 (3.8)		9.4 (2.3)		4.9 (2.2)
Family*YSM*10		10.6 (4.0)		20.4 (3.0)		2.4 (2.4)		-1.4 (1.9)
Refugee*YSM*10		39.1 (7.1)		48.9 (8.0)		7.5 (4.7)		13.2 (5.8)
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Intercept	126.8	-117.9	93.0	-275.8	240.1	86.1	225.6	79.2
(All*100)	(5.8)	(28.5)	(4.8)	(21.6)	(3.6)	(14.6)	(3.5)	(13.8)
Means	83.7	83.7	60.5	60.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows selected parameter estimates from models of employment and wages by gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The results in columns labelled 'A' are from models with only controls for year. The results in columns labelled 'B' are from models which also have controls for age, age squared, country of origin, highest qualification, location, health status, and parental status. The employment sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894. The wage equation subsample consists of 4,576 men and 4,841 women who were interviewed in Waves 1 or 5 of the LFS, are employees, and provided wage information. n=9,417.

Comparing columns A and B in the probit models of employment, introducing the control variables attenuates all of the main effects, but the signs do not change, and they remain statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the differences in employment propensity between the motive groups are only partially explained by the quite distinct characteristics of the groups. In the log wage equations, introducing controls does not greatly alter most of the main effects, although the relative wage penalty faced by male refugees is attenuated, and the relative wage penalty faced by family immigrants is increased. The largest impact of introducing controls is on the estimates for student immigrants: both male and female student immigrants enjoy a large wage premium over other motive groups in Column A, but

these effectively vanish when controls are introduced. This suggests the wage advantage enjoyed by student immigrants over work immigrants is explained by their distinctive characteristics.

For the employment probits with the full set of controls in Column B, I also calculate the marginal impact of each different motive relative to a reference individual: a work immigrant living in London, whose highest qualification is from abroad and is below degree level, who is from Pakistan, aged 35, in a couple, living with children, and has been in the UK for 10 years. These are not the mean characteristics in the sample, but I choose this reference individual since he or she could plausibly be in any of the motive categories. I refer to these marginal effects in the discussion that follows.

3.4 What do these results mean for immigrants in the labour market?

In line with my expectations, and indeed with much of the theoretical and empirical literature in this area, both male and female work immigrants who have settled in the UK are more economically integrated than those driven by other motives: no other motive group has a higher conditional probability of employment or higher wages. Crucially, work immigrants are not strong labour market performers because of where they are from or how long they have been in the country: the fact that they were motivated by work is associated with improved performance independent of these and other relevant characteristics. This is consistent with positive self-selection on labour market ability and motivation.

Student immigrants are not far behind work immigrants on either employment propensity or wages, which suggests similar selectivity. Indeed, the wages of both male and female student immigrants are statistically indistinguishable from those of work immigrants after introducing controls. However, both male and female student immigrants do have a lower employment propensity (2 percentage points lower compared to the reference individual for men, 9 percentage points lower for women). This may be due to more heterogeneity in the intentions and labour market abilities of student immigrants.

Male family immigrants are also relatively close to work immigrants on employment propensity: a male family immigrant is only 3 percentage points less likely to be employed than the reference work immigrant. However, the wage penalty faced by male family immigrants compared to work immigrants is high (24%). Lower wages are consistent with the anticipated lower degree of self-selection on labour market ability. Female family immigrants are much less economically integrated than their male counterparts, and this may be due to a stronger orientation towards family activities. They are 21 percentage points less likely to be employed than the reference female work immigrant with identical observed characteristics, and those who are employed earn 16% less. This is in line with lower selectivity and reduced focus on the labour market.

As expected, refugees have the worst labour market experiences of any of the motive groups, and the scale of disadvantage is striking: refugees of both sexes are far behind on employment propensity and wages. A male refugee is 13 percentage points less likely to be employed than the reference individual with otherwise identical characteristics, while female refugees are 29 percentage points less likely to be employed. Male refugee employees earn 31% less than male work immigrants, while female refugees earn 28% less than female work immigrants. It is worth reiterating that these differences are not driven by where refugees come from, how long they have been in the UK, or any of the other characteristics included in the models (including the high proportion with no qualifications, and the high proportion who suffer from work-impeding health problems): they are independently associated with the refugee motive. These results are in line with weak self-selection, less focus on labour market outcomes, possible labour market scarring, discrimination, and a low degree of selection on outflow.

Using the parameter estimates for the impact of ‘Years since migration’ and associated interaction effects, I have also calculated predicted probabilities of employment and predicted hourly wages over years since migration: these are displayed in Figures F1 and F2 in the Appendix. They should be interpreted as probabilities for the same reference individual as the marginal effects above, except in this case the probabilities are absolute rather than relative to work immigrants. The charts extend to 30 years since migration, which would cover around 90% of the

sample. All of the trajectories are statistically distinct, except the slopes for female work and family immigrants' wages.

In the refugee group, there is a clear upward trajectory in employment propensity and wages over years since migration: this suggests that refugees can 'catch-up' to some extent on the labour market over time, though from a very low starting point. Cortes (2004) highlights a similar 'catch up' among refugees in the USA, and she suggests that it is a result of longer time horizons in the host country, and higher investment in country-specific human capital. Student immigrants also show an increase in wages with time in the country, which may reflect longer time horizons in the country in this group as well, or perhaps the impact of a stronger preference for human capital accumulation. Female work immigrants show a decrease in employment propensity over years since migration: this indicates that although this group starts with a relatively high employment propensity, they also leave employment at a higher rate than other groups.

These results support my assertion that original motives are critical for understanding immigrant labour market behaviour. The strong performance of work immigrants, and to a lesser extent student and male family immigrants, contrasts with that of female family immigrants and particularly refugees.

3.4.1 Possible mechanisms: Networks and English language ability

How exactly are these different original motives affecting employment and wages? Many of the precise mechanisms will be unobservable, but the LFS contains limited information on two possible mechanisms that may give some indication: use of networks to find employment, and English language ability.

I have noted above that family immigrants and refugees are thought to make increased use of family and social networks to find work, and that this has been linked to lower quality employment in these groups. There is information in the LFS on how any respondents looking for work are doing so (regardless of their current labour market

status),³⁵ and also on how employed respondents found their current job (this is only asked to those who got their job in the last year).³⁶ Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix show some of the responses to these questions by gender and original motive.

When looking for work, male family immigrants and refugees are the most intensive users of family and social networks, with 11% and 13% reporting that their main method of looking for work was ‘Asking friends, relatives, colleagues or trade unions about jobs’. However, male work immigrants are only slightly less likely to use such networks, with just under 11% reporting this as their main method. Indeed, among women, this method is most used by work immigrants, with 9% identifying it as their main method. Among those who are asked how they found their current job, male family immigrants and refugees again seem the most likely to have used networks, with 34% and 40% reporting that they found their job by ‘Hearing from someone who worked there’. Work immigrants are slightly less likely to have found their job in this way, with 29% reporting that they did so.

To estimate the wage associations of finding work through networks for different motive groups, I run model (2) on the subset of the sample for whom I have job-finding information, and add a dummy equal to one if the current job was found through ‘Hearing from someone who worked there’. The main parameter estimates from this subsample are qualitatively similar to those from using the full sample. Without introducing other controls, I find that men who found their job in this way earn lower wages (18% lower), and that the estimated wages penalties faced by family immigrants and refugees relative to work immigrants fall by 1 and 2 percentage points respectively when finding work in this way is accounted for. Repeating this test using the full set of controls, the wage penalties faced by family

³⁵ This question is: *Did you do any of these things...? (1) Visit a Jobcentre/Job-market or Jobs and Benefits Centres (2) Visit a Careers Office (3) Visit a Jobclub (4) Have name on the books of a private employment agency (5) Advertise for jobs in newspapers, journals or on the internet (6) Answer advertisements in newspapers, journals or on the internet (7) Study situations vacant columns in newspapers journals, or on the internet (8) Apply directly to employers (9) Ask friends, relatives, colleagues or trade unions about jobs (10) Wait for the results of an application for a job (14) Do anything else to find work.* (ONS, 2014b)

³⁶ The question is: *Did you get the work that you are doing through...(1) Replying to a job advertisement? (2) A JobCentre/Jobmarket or Training Employment Agency Office? (3) A Careers/Connexions Office? (4) A JobClub? (5) A private employment agency or business? (6) Hearing from someone who worked there? (7) A direct application? (8) Or in some other way?* (ONS, 2014b).

immigrants and refugees still fall, though by less than 1 percentage point. Among women, the effect of this dummy on the main estimates is similar to that for men. This suggests that the association between use of networks and wages is mostly explained by the other control variables, though a modest independent association remains.

Language ability is also important for labour market success among immigrants (see Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003), so if there were systematic variation in language ability by original motive, this could explain some of the variation in labour market outcomes. Some questions on language ability are included in one quarter of the LFS every three years – so I am able to use the five waves of data from the third quarter of 2012 to examine the level of ability by original motive. I apply the same restrictions to this sample as detailed above, but it is a distinct sample, and not all cases within it are in the main analytical sample (since the construction of the main sample prioritises wage information – see the discussion in Section 2.2, above). Table A9 in the Appendix shows responses to the three language-related questions by original motive and gender: they cover first language at home, language difficulties in finding or keeping a job, and language difficulties in education.³⁷

Student immigrants are the least likely to have had employment or education difficulties related to language, and are the least likely to speak a foreign language at home. Work immigrants are next least likely to experience language problems, followed by family immigrants and refugees. In order to get a sense of the extent to which these differences in language ability are associated with labour market outcomes, I run OLS models of log wages on the sample with language information, with dummies for the different motive groups, and both with and without a dummy for ‘language difficulties in finding or keeping a job’. The main parameter estimates from these models are qualitatively similar to those from using the full sample, although the small sample size does not allow for the inclusion of controls beyond dummies for international region of origin.³⁸ Without these origin controls, men who report language difficulties in finding or keeping a job earn 37% less than those who

³⁷ The questions are: (i) *What is your first language at home?* (ii) *Have you experienced any language difficulties that have caused problems in finding or keeping a job?* (iii) *Have you experienced any language difficulties that have caused problems with your education?* (ONS, 2014b)

³⁸ Dummies for those born in Africa, the Americas, Asia, EU15 countries, and those born elsewhere, with those born in A8 countries as the reference group.

do not, and controlling for language difficulties reduces the earnings penalty for male refugees relative to work immigrants by nearly 3 percentage points. For male family immigrants, the equivalent earnings penalty falls by 1 percentage point. The size of the language penalty and the effect of accounting for language difficulties is similar after introducing controls for international region of origin. This suggests that at least part of the labour market disadvantage experienced by family immigrants and refugees is attributable to language difficulties, although without a larger subsample it is not possible to separate this effect from the influence of other observed characteristics.

The subgroup analyses I have conducted here confirm findings from elsewhere that use of family and social networks and language difficulties are associated with labour market outcomes among immigrants, and there are some indications that they may help to explain differences by original motive. However, it appears that most of the differences by original motive are driven by unobserved characteristics.

4. Do original motives matter for national identity?

4.1 How might original motives matter for national identity?

Adopting a new national identity should be much easier than relocating across international borders. There are no financial or administrative costs associated with it, and no requirement to change one's behaviour in response. However, when asked, most settled immigrants report that they have not taken up the national identity of their host country: psychological location is clearly more resistant to change than country of residence.

Why might an immigrant take up a British national identity? The emerging view in economics is that adopting a new national identity is psychologically costly, and will therefore make sense only for those who find the investment particularly rewarding. I noted above that national identity is a concept closely related to legal citizenship, and Manning and Roy (2010: F93) find that immigrants from outside the EEA are more likely to report a British national identity than those from within. This may be because those from outside the EEA have much stronger incentives to take-up legal

citizenship,³⁹ and this in turn leads to a stronger sense of attachment to the host country. The same authors also find that immigrants from Commonwealth countries are more likely to identify with Britain than those from countries without such strong historical links. We know from other empirical work that those who feel they have faced discrimination in the host society are less likely to adopt the native national identity (Georgiadis and Manning, 2013: 176; Platt, 2014: 66), and that those who have lived for a longer time in the host country are more likely to adopt the national identity (Dustmann, 1996: 44-45; Manning and Roy, 2010: F90; Platt, 2014: 56).

These results have an intuitive appeal: adopting a British identity is clearly more rewarding for those with legal citizenship, those who are from a Commonwealth country, and those who have lived in the country for a longer time. It is less rewarding for those who feel they have faced discrimination. However, these factors do not explain one important feature of the evidence on variation in uptake of a British national identity among immigrants: that it is those from the most culturally distinct countries that are most likely to report feeling British.

Explaining their own empirical results on national identity, Manning and Roy (2010: F94-F96) suggest that adoption of the native national identity is used as a psychological adjustment mechanism by immigrants from countries that are more culturally distant from the host country, who are thereby able to compensate partially for their own cultural differences. In this theory, immigrants potentially suffer from two psychological losses in the host country relating to their culture and identity: there is one loss from being culturally distinctive, and a second from ‘betraying’ their home country by adopting the host identity. An immigrant can feel better about her cultural distinctiveness by adopting the host identity, but this comes at the cost of betraying her home identity. Those from culturally similar countries therefore have little to gain by adopting the host identity, and have less incentive to endure the psychological costs of betraying their home identity. However, those from culturally very distinctive countries have a much stronger incentive to adopt the host national identity, as a way to engage with the host society in the absence of strong behavioural affinities.

³⁹ EEA nationals are allowed access to the UK labour market, whereas non-EEA nationals can only enjoy the same rights by taking up an EEA citizenship.

This ‘cultural distance’ theory is consistent with the traditional notion of national identity as a device which unites behaviourally diverse groups in a multicultural society.⁴⁰ If a national identity is functioning well, then the most culturally distinct immigrants will be most inclined to adopt it: this is one of the factors that helps diverse societies to cohere.

What would the theory imply for the importance of original motives in determining uptake of the native national identity? While cultural distance may explain much variation in uptake of national identity at a ‘country of origin’ level, within any origin country group there will be individuals who are more or less culturally adaptive. In general, we can expect work and student immigrants to be self-selected on cultural adaptability: in the human capital calculus, the psychological costs of migration are thus lowered, as are the costs of return migration. In the ‘cultural distance’ model, this cultural adaptability reduces the potential loss associated with behavioural differences, and makes the adoption of a native national identity less necessary.

There is less reason to expect the same selectivity on cultural adaptability among those whose decision to migrate was largely dictated by others, or those whose migration was forced. For this reason, we can expect family immigrants and refugees in general to be less culturally adaptive, and more culturally distinct from the host society than work and student immigrants. In the ‘cultural distance’ theory, it is these immigrants who will find adoption of the native national identity most rewarding, since it compensates them for the psychological loss associated with their cultural distinctiveness.

We have already seen those on work or student visas have a higher outflow over time, which fits with these expectations: those who migrated by choice are more able to adapt to different environments, and therefore find returning home a less costly exercise. This increased likelihood of returning home will further reduce the psychologically costly take-up of the native national identity among the stock of work and student immigrants. We can also expect these increased outflows to be

⁴⁰ See the discussion on the functions of national identity in Georgiadis and Manning (2013: 167-168).

particularly selected: other things equal, those who leave must be disproportionately those least likely to report a British national identity. This will reinforce the differences in national identity by original motive in the immigrant stock.

4.2 Are there any differences in national identity by original motive?

I show the proportion of immigrants reporting foreign, mixed and British national identities in Table 4, by gender and original motive. It is worth bearing in mind that foreign and mixed national identities are extremely rare among the UK-born. In the comparable age range and time frame, less than 1% of UK-born men and women report an exclusively foreign national identity, while almost none report a mixed national identity. This is low by European standards, considering that a proportion of the UK-born will be the children of immigrants. As Platt (2014: 53) points out, identification as British is almost universal among the ‘second generation’ – contrast this with Casey and Dustmann’s (2010: F37) finding that more than half of the children of immigrants in Germany identify more strongly with their parent’s country of birth than their own.

Table 4 shows that, overall, around a third of settled immigrants in the UK report feeling only British, and around 60% report only a foreign national identity. Within the motive groups, just under half of refugees report only a British national identity, along with just under half of family immigrants – although female family immigrants are slightly less likely to report an exclusively British national identity than men. Around a third of male student immigrants report only a British national identity, and closer to a quarter of female student immigrants do so. Work immigrants are the least likely to report an exclusively British national identity, with around 20% doing so. Work immigrants are also the least likely to report a mixed national identity, although the proportion of any motive group doing so is relatively small.

Table 4: National identity by gender and original motive, row %

	National identity			Total
	Foreign	Mixed	British	
Men				
Economic	76.0	3.6	20.3	100.0
Student	61.5	5.2	33.3	100.0
Family	44.3	6.4	49.4	100.0
Refugee	47.6	5.7	46.8	100.0
All	63.7	4.7	31.6	100.0
Women				
Economic	78.7	4.2	17.1	100.0
Student	68.8	6.1	25.2	100.0
Family	50.2	6.3	43.5	100.0
Refugee	46.2	6.8	46.9	100.0
All	61.5	5.7	32.8	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the proportion of the sample with each national identification, by original motive and gender. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

4.3 Are these national identity outcomes explained by other observed characteristics?

The differences in Table 4 are broadly in line with my prior expectations about variation in the adoption of a British national identity by original motive. However, we know the observed characteristics of the different motive groups are quite different: recall the descriptive statistics in Table A3 in the Appendix. Many of the same characteristics that were relevant to labour market performance are also associated with national identity. As Dustmann (1996: 52) points out, labour market adjustment and the adoption of a native national identity appear to be parallel processes, in that they are driven by many of the same characteristics, though they do not tend to affect each other.

One additional characteristic of interest that I did not address when looking at labour market performance is age of arrival: adopting a new national identity is likely to be a less worthwhile investment as arrival age increases. The mean arrival age by motive varies from 23 for female family immigrants to just over 28 for male refugees. The sample average is 27 for men and 26 for women.

In order to assess the conditional importance of original motives for feelings of national identity, I estimate binomial probit models. As before, I estimate the models separately for men and women. The models take the same form as model (1), except with BRITISH as the dependent variable, which takes a value of 1 if individual i reports a British national identity. This is regardless of whether the individual also reports a foreign national identity, so the small proportion with ‘mixed’ national identities will also count as British.

The control variables here include arrival age, education (as before, five dummies with ‘no qualifications’ as the reference category), parental status (as before, two dummies with ‘no children’ as the reference category), and the same set of 36 origin dummies (29 countries plus 6 country groups, and Poland as the reference category). As discussed above, this set of origin dummies will play an important role in establishing whether original motives have a role in distinguishing the identities of people from within the same country or region. These dummies will also account for different country- or region-level visa requirements. In robustness checks below, I also include a control for legal citizenship. Preparatory investigations revealed the relationship between national identity and years since migration to be approximately log-linear: I therefore include the log of ‘years since migration’ in the probit model, along with interactions between this variable and each motive group dummy (centred on the mean of the log of YSM), as a more parsimonious alternative to multiple YSM dummies.

β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 in this case give the change in the probit index for national identity associated with each original motive group, relative to work immigrants, conditional on the included control variables. The columns labelled ‘A’ in Table 5 show the key estimates from running the national identity model with no controls. The columns labelled ‘B’ show the estimates after the full set of controls have been introduced. The parameter estimates and their standard errors are multiplied by 100, and the full results are presented in Table A10 in the Appendix.

Table 5: Selected parameter estimates from models of British national identity by gender

	Probit models			
	Men		Women	
	A	B	A	B
Motives				
Work	(REF)			
Student	41.5 (3.2)	-4.4 (4.4)	30.6 (3.5)	-1.1 (4.5)
Family	85.2 (3.2)	34.7 (3.9)	79.0 (2.7)	22.5 (3.5)
Refugee	76.8 (4.1)	31.4 (5.5)	89.1 (4.9)	28.5 (6.1)
Years since migration				
ln_YSM		86.0 (4.2)		78.4 (4.7)
Student*ln_YSM		35.6 (6.6)		28.1 (6.9)
Family*ln_YSM		-14.8 (6.2)		6.6 (5.3)
Refugee*ln_YSM		10.3 (10.6)		33.8 (12.1)
Other controls				
Intercept	No	Yes	No	Yes
(All*100)	-70.7 (1.9)	-387.0 (14.4)	-79.6 (2.2)	-351.1 (14.7)
Means	36.3	36.3	38.5	38.5

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows selected parameter estimates from models of British national identity by gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The columns labelled 'A' show results from models with no control variables. The columns labelled 'B' show results from models that also have controls for age of arrival, country of origin, highest qualification, and parental status. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Comparing the main effects in columns A and B for men and women in Table 5, introducing the control variables causes a large drop in the parameter estimates. This suggests that a substantial proportion of the variation in uptake of a British national identity is explained by the observed characteristics in the models. For student immigrants, the differences with work immigrants disappear completely. However, for family immigrants and refugees, the effects remain positive and well-determined after introducing controls.

As before, I calculate the marginal impact of each different motive relative to a reference individual who is a work immigrant, whose highest qualification is from abroad and is below degree level, who is from Pakistan, who is in a couple with

children, who arrived in the UK aged 25, and who has been in the country for 10 years. I refer to these marginal effects in the discussion that follows.

4.4 What do these results mean for the national identity of immigrants?

In line with my expectations based on the ‘cultural distance’ model, family immigrants and refugees are the most likely to report a British national identity. However, the largest positive effect sizes are associated with national origin: particularly Commonwealth African and Asian countries, but also non-Commonwealth countries (for example, Afghanistan, the Philippines, China, Turkey, and Somalia); see Table A10 in the Appendix for a complete list of estimates. These results are consistent with the findings in Manning and Roy (2010). However, original motives remain a strong, well-determined predictor of uptake of national identity even after these country and region of origin effects are accounted for.

Family immigrants feel the most British of any motive group: male family immigrants are 15 percentage points more likely to report a British national identity than the reference work immigrant with identical observed characteristics, while female family immigrants are 8 percentage points so. This is consistent with the proposition that family immigrants are less selected on cultural adaptability, and that they therefore have a stronger propensity to take up the native national identity. Recall that I have controlled for parental status in this model, so this is not driving the difference, although being in a couple with children does seem to have a modest but significant positive effect on the relative probability of reporting a British national identity.

Refugees have similarly high conditional probabilities of reporting a British national identity. Male refugees are 12 percentage points more likely to report a British identity than the reference work immigrant with identical observed characteristics, while female refugees are 9 percentage points so. As expected, student and work immigrants have lower conditional probabilities of reporting a British national identity.

I show predicted probabilities of British national identity over years since migration in Figure F3 in the Appendix. They should be interpreted as probabilities for the same

reference individual as the marginal effects above, except in this case the probabilities are absolute rather than relative to work immigrants. Most of the trajectories are similar for the different motive groups: indeed, the slopes for male refugees and work immigrants are statistically indistinguishable, as are those for female student and refugee immigrants. As would be expected, those who have arrived more recently are much less likely to report a British national identity than those who have been in the country for a longer time.

Given the relative immigrant outflows by visa category, the effects I have reported for family immigrants, and particularly for refugees, are likely to be underestimates. Work and student immigrants are most likely to leave the country: if those who leave the country are those who feel least British, then they will leave the stock of work and student immigrants feeling more British on average. The outflow of family immigrants and refugees is smaller, so the stock will not be as selected on this characteristic.

These results show that original motives are important for understanding immigrant uptake of the native national identity. Family immigrants and refugees are more likely to feel British than work or student immigrants – even those that come from the same country, and who have been in the country for exactly the same number of years. My expectations were based on the ‘cultural distance’ model, but these empirical results provide a new level of support for it: people from culturally distant home countries are more likely to take up the native national identity, but even when country of origin effects have been comprehensively accounted for, family immigrants and refugees are substantially more likely to feel British than work and student immigrants.

In order to assess whether these results are affected by respondents conflating national identity with legal citizenship, I have run alternative versions of the models of British national identity presented above, including controls for legal citizenship. The most important estimates from these models are presented in Table A11 in the Appendix. In Column A, I reproduce the results of the model in Table 5 with full controls. In Column B, I show the same model with an additional control for legal citizenship. The legal citizenship estimate is large and well determined, and its introduction attenuates the estimates associated with each motive group. However, the sign of the

main estimates does not change, and the differences for family and refugee immigrants remain strong and statistically significant. This means that even when comparing only immigrants who hold legal citizenship, the higher propensity of family immigrants and refugees to report a British national identity remains. I have also estimated versions of these models excluding proxy respondents, who could potentially misreport the national identity of the other householders for whom they are responding, but the results are unaffected.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I asked whether the original motives for migration could help us understand variation in immigrants' labour market performance and uptake of the native national identity. I noted that the human capital approach provides some predictions about both labour market ability and cultural adaptability, which, alongside the 'cultural distance' model of national identity proposed by Manning and Roy (2010), allow us to form expectations about such outcomes. I have shown that original motives are important for the analysis of both these areas of immigrant experience.

My results provide new support for the human capital model of migration in both the economic and cultural spheres, as well as early evidence supporting the 'cultural distance' model of national identity. Beyond highlighting the direction of the conditional differences between motive groups, I have also provided estimates of the scale of variation in employment propensity, wages, and uptake of the native national identity.

I have found that, among those who have been in the UK for at least five years, work immigrants perform exceptionally well on the labour market, with the highest employment propensities and the highest wages, closely followed by student immigrants. Family immigrants do less well, particularly female family immigrants. Refugees have extremely poor labour market outcomes by comparison with the other motive groups, having the lowest employment propensities and the lowest wages. However, turning to uptake of the native national identity, I have found that family immigrants and refugees are the most likely to identify as British. These differences

are not explained by country of origin, years since migration, age, or qualifications. The differential levels and characteristics of immigrant outflow by original motive are important for understanding my results, as are the role of family and social networks in the host country, and language ability.

I have noted above that the ‘cultural distance’ model is consistent with the traditional notion of national identity as a device which unites behaviourally diverse groups in a multicultural society, and in this respect, the UK appears to have a well-functioning, culturally-inclusive national identity. However, the employment and wage analysis in this paper has shown that we cannot take the successful labour market integration of all immigrants for granted. While the political appeal of promoting uptake of the native national identity among immigrants is clear, policy makers should be wary of neglecting more concrete measures to cultivate social and economic inclusion.

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
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
Appendix

Figure F1: Predicted probabilities of employment over years since migration, by gender and original motive

a) Men




b) Women




Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: These charts show predicted probabilities calculated from probit models of employment, including controls for age, age squared, country of origin, highest qualification, location, health status, and parental status. The reference individual is from Pakistan, with a highest qualification that is from abroad and is below degree level, has a partner and children, and is 35 years old. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Figure F2: Predicted hourly wages over years since migration, by gender and original motive

a) Men




b) Women



Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: These charts show predicted hourly wages calculated from wage equations, including controls for age, age squared, country of origin, highest qualification, location, health status, and parental status. The reference individual is from Pakistan, with a highest qualification that is from abroad and is below degree level, has a partner and children, and is 35 years old. The sample consists of 4,576 men and 4,841 women who were interviewed in Waves 1 or 5 of the LFS, are employees, and provided wage information. n=9,417.

Figure F3: Predicted probabilities of reporting a British national identity over years since migration, by gender and original motive

a) Men



b) Women



Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: These charts show predicted probabilities calculated from probit models of British national identity, including controls for age of arrival, country of origin, highest qualification, and parental status. The reference individual is from Pakistan, with a highest qualification that is from abroad and is below degree level, has a partner and children, and arrived in the UK aged 25. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Table A1: Comparison of labour market status among recent and settled immigrants, by gender and original motive

	Recent				Settled			
	Emp	Unemp	Inact	Total	Emp	Unemp	Inact	Total
Men								
Economic	91.5	6.1	2.4	100.0	88.6	4.0	7.4	100.0
Student	38.0	6.2	55.9	100.0	83.8	5.2	11.0	100.0
Family	68.9	13.2	17.8	100.0	81.2	6.2	12.6	100.0
Refugee	25.8	20.5	53.8	100.0	64.6	13.8	21.6	100.0
Total	69.9	7.4	22.7	100.0	83.7	5.7	10.6	100.0
Women								
Economic	83.6	6.3	10.1	100.0	80.5	3.9	15.6	100.0
Student	33.2	6.7	60.1	100.0	73.0	4.8	22.2	100.0
Family	32.4	10.8	56.8	100.0	47.6	5.4	47.0	100.0
Refugee	12.6	9.9	77.5	100.0	30.1	10.7	59.2	100.0
Total	49.1	8.3	42.5	100.0	60.5	5.2	34.3	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the proportion of people with each labour market status, by original motive, gender, and 'recent' or 'settled' status. 'Settled' immigrants are defined as those who arrived five or more years ago. The recent group consists of 10,763 immigrants (5,062 men and 5,701 women), while the 'settled' group consists of 24,894 immigrants (11,160 men and 13,734 women). n= 35,657.

Table A2: Wave origins of the sample

Wave (in order of priority)	Frequency	Percent
1	16,012	64.3
5	5,775	23.2
2	1,989	8.0
3	879	3.5
4	239	1.0
Total	24,894	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the number and proportion of the main analytical sample drawn from each wave of the LFS. I prioritise observations that appear in Wave 1, and then those that appear in Wave 5 of the survey, as these are the two waves of the LFS which contain wage information. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Table A3: General demographic and human capital characteristics of sample, by gender and original motive

	Motive				Total
	Work	Student	Family	Refugee	
Men					
General:					
Arrival age (μ)	27.8	26.4	23.9	28.2	26.9
Age (μ)	40.9	39.5	42.6	41.4	41.0
London (%)	34.4	42.7	27.3	47.0	36.0
Health prob (%)	11.2	8.5	18.3	29.4	13.9
FT student (%)	1.2	10.5	2.1	4.4	3.7
Parental status (sums to 100%):					
No children	49.6	53.7	37.6	44.1	47.5
Single parent	0.8	1.1	1.4	2.6	1.2
Couple parent	49.7	45.2	61.0	53.3	51.4
Highest qualification (sums to 100%):					
No quals	14.7	2.4	21.3	32.3	15.1
UK qual below deg	5.1	11.8	8.1	7.3	7.3
UK 1st deg	2.0	16.7	3.9	3.7	5.5
UK high deg	4.2	36.2	3.2	3.2	10.5
Foreign qual below deg	42.7	15.4	41.2	44.6	37.0
Foreign deg or above	31.3	17.4	22.3	8.9	24.6
Origin (sums to 100%):					
A8 born	28.8	3.7	1.7	0.8	15.3
African born	13.7	28.8	18.0	34.6	19.8
Americas born	4.6	5.9	9.1	0.4	5.4
Asian born	26.1	42.5	56.8	49.0	38.0
EU15 born	16.7	11.9	7.0	0.0	12.1
Born elsewhere	10.1	7.2	7.3	15.2	9.4
Women					
General:					
Arrival age (μ)	27.8	26.0	23.0	27.1	26.0
Age (μ)	39.4	38.3	42.7	40.9	40.9
London (%)	33.8	45.3	32.0	55.1	36.1
Health prob (%)	9.1	9.3	21.3	34.4	16.4
FT student (%)	2.5	9.9	2.9	7.8	4.2
Parental status (sums to 100%):					
No children	49.1	53.0	38.1	30.1	43.3
Single parent	10.5	10.8	9.4	35.8	11.6
Couple parent	40.4	36.3	52.5	34.1	45.1
Highest qualification (sums to 100%):					
No quals	10.5	2.4	23.8	35.4	16.7
UK qual below deg	6.7	14.5	7.5	13.5	8.7
UK 1st deg	3.2	16.6	3.0	3.5	5.3
UK high deg	4.8	29.3	3.6	1.3	8.0
Foreign qual below deg	40.0	16.8	37.1	38.5	34.8
Foreign deg or above	34.9	20.4	24.9	7.8	26.5
Origin (sums to 100%):					
A8 born	33.2	11.6	6.6	1.7	15.0
African born	12.9	20.9	16.1	54.4	18.3
Americas born	5.2	11.2	7.2	1.3	6.9
Asian born	18.6	27.3	52.7	27.0	36.8
EU15 born	21.3	20.7	9.0	0.1	14.1
Born elsewhere	8.7	8.3	8.3	15.5	8.9

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the general demographic and human capital characteristics of sample, by original motive and gender. The full sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894. Three of these variables do not cover the whole sample: the 'Highest qualifications' sample is 16,258 (7,290 men, 8,968 women); the 'Health' sample is 22,102 (9,911 men, 12,191 women); and the 'Parental status' sample is 23,615 (10,562 men, 13,053 women).

Table A4: Distribution of years since migration in sample, by gender and original motive

	Distribution					RANGE
	Q10	Q25	Q50	Q75	Q90	
Men						
Work	5	6	9	15	27	43
Student	6	8	12	21	34	41
Family	6	8	12	22	34	43
Refugee	8	9	12	16	22	39
Total	6	7	10	18	30	43
Women						
Work	5	6	9	14	26	43
Student	6	8	12	20	33	42
Family	6	8	13	23	34	43
Refugee	7	9	12	16	21	37
Total	6	7	11	20	32	43

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows selected quantiles of the distribution of ‘years since migration’ in the sample, by original motive and gender. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Table A5: Full parameter estimates from probit models of employment, by gender

	Men		Women	
	Estimate	Std. Error	Estimate	Std. Error
Intercept	-117.9	28.5	-275.8	21.6
Work	REF		REF	
Student	-15.3	5.6	-18.7	4.5
Family	-24.3	5.2	-53.9	3.4
Refugee	-63.2	6.4	-87.2	6.6
Age	13.9	1.3	20.3	1.0
Age2	-0.2	0.0	-0.2	0.0
YSM*10	-3.6	3.2	-17.7	3.0
Stu*YSM*10	15.9	4.1	17.2	3.8
Fam*YSM*10	10.6	4.0	20.4	3.0
Ref*YSM*10	39.1	7.1	48.9	8.0
No quals	REF		REF	
UK qual below deg	43.7	8.9	73.1	6.6
UK 1st deg	29.1	9.7	94.5	8.3
UK high deg	58.4	8.9	94.2	7.4
For qual <deg	26.2	5.7	46.0	4.8
For qual deg or >	56.7	7.0	67.8	5.2
Missing qual info	36.5	7.0	66.8	5.9
Non-London	REF		REF	
London	0.3	3.5	-11.3	2.7
No health problem	REF		REF	
Health problem	-112.6	4.3	-75.8	3.8
Missing health info	7.0	5.5	-10.9	4.0
Not full-time student	REF		REF	
Full-time student	-105.1	7.3	-71.4	6.1
No children	REF		REF	
Single parent	-13.9	13.6	-42.1	4.6
Couple parent	22.7	3.7	-57.7	3.3
Missing parental status	23.6	8.6	-37.8	6.6
Poland	REF			
Afghanistan	5.1	15.7	-56.6	16.2
Australia	-17.5	18.9	31.0	16.4
Bangladesh	-36.6	11.4	-126.9	9.8
China	-61.4	13.6	-51.1	9.9
France	-21.1	17.1	-26.6	10.0
Germany	-19.4	17.2	-12.8	9.6
Ghana	-53.6	14.1	-5.4	10.7
India	-19.0	8.9	-16.3	5.9
Iran	-46.5	13.6	-59.9	13.0
Iraq	-52.2	12.8	-115.1	17.5
Ireland	-12.1	11.9	-2.8	8.4
Italy	-39.2	14.5	-12.0	12.7
Jamaica	-50.9	17.3	-0.2	13.0
Kenya	-38.1	14.0	-3.7	10.9
Lithuania	3.9	17.1	5.5	10.5
New Zealand	-22.5	23.6	-9.2	17.5
Nigeria	-55.4	11.4	-9.8	9.1
Pakistan	-28.0	9.3	-121.7	6.9
Philippines	27.1	18.6	37.9	9.4
Portugal	-34.5	14.4	-17.9	11.2
Romania	-22.3	17.1	0.8	13.4
Slovakia	-36.9	19.7	-13.1	13.1
Somalia	-74.7	14.3	-111.2	12.1
South Africa	9.7	13.9	6.1	9.1
Spain	-44.3	18.3	-5.3	13.5
Sri Lanka	2.2	12.7	-41.5	9.3
Turkey	-55.1	12.9	-100.1	12.0
United States	-9.2	15.1	3.9	9.9

Zimbabwe	-31.6	12.8	9.4	9.9
Other A8	-12.4	15.2	-21.2	8.9
Other Africa	-51.8	9.0	-36.2	6.6
Other Americas	-24.2	12.1	-30.1	7.6
Other Asia	-44.6	9.8	-30.7	6.5
Other EU15	-26.4	13.9	-2.7	8.8
Born elsewhere	-41.4	9.8	-33.4	6.9
2014.0	REF			
2010.0	-5.8	8.5	-18.0	6.7
2011.0	-1.1	7.1	-5.0	5.5
2012.0	6.9	7.4	-10.1	5.7
2013.0	5.4	7.1	-1.1	5.4

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows all parameter estimates from models of employment by gender. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Table A6: Full parameter estimates from wage models by gender

	Men		Women	
	Estimate	Std. Error	Estimate	Std. Error
Intercept	86.1	14.6	79.2	13.8
Work	REF		REF	
Student	-4.1	2.4	-1.5	2.3
Family	-26.9	2.3	-17.2	1.8
Refugee	-37.0	3.9	-33.4	4.9
Age	4.4	0.7	4.8	0.7
Age2	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0
YSM*10	2.3	1.8	5.2	1.8
Stu*YSM*10	9.4	2.3	4.9	2.2
Fam*YSM*10	2.4	2.4	-1.4	1.9
Ref*YSM*10	7.5	4.7	13.2	5.8
No quals	REF		REF	
UK qual below deg	31.9	4.4	24.8	4.4
UK 1st deg	50.3	5.0	44.5	4.8
UK high deg	67.7	4.2	55.3	4.5
For qual <deg	9.9	3.3	6.8	3.7
For qual deg or >	50.5	3.5	39.8	3.7
Missing qual info	22.6	4.1	13.9	4.3
Non-London	REF		REF	
London	11.8	1.7	15.9	1.6
No health problem	REF		REF	
Health problem	-14.3	3.1	-6.4	2.8
Missing health info	-1.9	2.4	-1.3	2.2
Not full-time student	REF		REF	
Full-time student	-21.4	5.0	2.9	4.3
No children	REF		REF	
Single parent	6.3	9.4	-11.9	2.6
Couple parent	5.6	1.7	0.3	1.7
Missing parental status	-1.3	3.8	1.9	3.7
Poland	REF		REF	
Afghanistan	9.9	9.4	8.8	16.1
Australia	80.0	7.6	51.3	6.8
Bangladesh	-10.2	5.4	-3.8	9.5
China	24.1	7.0	13.4	6.1
France	40.7	6.2	40.6	5.1
Germany	57.4	6.8	39.7	5.0
Ghana	14.8	6.5	2.1	6.0
India	31.8	3.2	25.4	3.1
Iran	20.9	7.7	23.8	9.2
Iraq	14.3	7.7	23.5	15.1
Ireland	59.6	5.1	45.5	4.2
Italy	20.0	6.4	18.2	6.4
Jamaica	20.9	9.0	21.0	7.2
Kenya	28.1	7.7	16.0	6.3
Lithuania	3.8	6.5	-4.7	5.0
New Zealand	58.1	8.9	65.7	7.5
Nigeria	15.8	5.0	21.0	5.0
Pakistan	9.3	4.2	15.6	5.6
Philippines	8.4	5.1	12.5	4.0
Portugal	3.6	6.3	4.7	6.1
Romania	17.7	9.8	8.1	8.3
Slovakia	6.0	8.5	4.3	6.6
Somalia	-6.7	8.8	22.3	10.5
South Africa	51.3	8.3	42.7	6.7
Spain	18.4	5.2	8.5	6.0
Sri Lanka	55.5	4.6	50.6	4.2
Turkey	0.8	8.2	20.4	9.7
United States	59.1	6.3	52.6	5.3
Zimbabwe	34.9	5.4	29.3	4.9
Other A8	9.1	6.0	-0.8	4.5
Other Africa	21.0	3.9	20.0	3.9
Other Americas	41.0	5.0	25.2	4.2
Other Asia	23.7	4.3	18.2	3.6
Other EU15	55.4	5.3	43.5	4.4
Born elsewhere	26.0	4.8	26.8	4.0
2014.0	REF		REF	
2010.0	17.2	4.3	17.2	4.1
2011.0	6.6	3.4	2.9	3.3
2012.0	3.8	3.5	1.1	3.4

2013.0

1.0

3.4

0.4

3.3

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows full parameter estimates from models of log wages by gender. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The sample consists of 4,576 men and 4,841 women who were interviewed in Waves 1 or 5 of the LFS, are employees, and provided wage information. n=9,417.

Table A7: Main methods of seeking work by gender and original motive, column %

	Economic	Student	Family	Refugee	Total
Men					
Ask friends, relatives, colleagues about jobs	10.6	6.4	11.3	13.1	10.3
Studying situations vacant in newspapers or journals	37.8	45.4	38.8	32.1	38.6
Other method	51.7	48.4	50.0	54.6	51.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Women					
Ask friends, relatives, colleagues about jobs	9.1	5.4	8.0	6.2	7.6
Studying situations vacant in newspapers or journals	40.9	43.5	45.7	37.0	43.2
Other method	50.0	51.3	46.2	56.8	49.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows main method of seeking work for the subsample that is currently seeking employment, by original motive and gender. Respondents are included regardless of current labour market status. The sample consists of 1,654 men and 1,541 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK aged 16 or older, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=3,195.

Table A8: Methods of finding current job by gender and original motive, column %

	Economic	Student	Family	Refugee	Total
Men					
Hearing from someone who worked there	28.9	21.1	34.0	39.5	29.3
Replying to a job advertisement	21.6	25.9	20.4	20.2	22.2
Other method	49.6	53.0	45.6	40.3	48.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Women					
Hearing from someone who worked there	22.3	17.6	24.9	24.0	22.3
Replying to a job advertisement	29.7	33.6	24.4	26.0	28.5
Other method	48.1	48.7	50.6	50.0	49.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows the method that employed respondents used to find their current job, restricted to those who found their job in the last 12 months. The sample is shown by original motive and gender. The sample consists of 1,073 men and 1,093 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK aged 16 or older, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=2,166.

Table A9: Language indicators by gender and original motive, %

Language measure	Motive					n
	Work	Student	Family	Refugee	Total	
Men						
Language difficulty finding or keeping a job	14.5	7.4	20.0	22.9	15.5	1,044
Language difficulty in education	6.7	7.5	14.0	12.2	9.0	1,042
Non-English first language at home	64.3	48.9	56.4	76.9	60.6	1,732
Women						
Language difficulty finding or keeping a job	13.8	11.6	23.5	39.1	20.4	1,169
Language difficulty in education	8.7	8.2	16.2	30.1	14.2	1,172
Non-English first language at home	54.7	43.1	58.2	75.8	55.6	2,112

Source: LFS 2012. Notes: This table shows three language indicators, drawn from the third quarter of the LFS in 2012. A slightly different group of respondents answered each question, so separate sample sizes are shown in the final column on the right. The sample is shown by original motive and gender.

Table A10: Full Parameter estimates from probit models of national identity by gender

	Men		Women	
	Estimate	Std. Error	Estimate	Std. Error
Intercept	-387.0	-14.4	-351.1	-14.7
Work	REF		REF	
Student	-4.4	4.4	-1.1	4.5
Family	34.7	3.9	22.5	3.5
Refugee	31.4	5.5	28.5	6.1
Arrival Age	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2
In_YSM	86.0	4.2	78.4	4.7
Stu*In_YSM	35.6	6.6	28.1	6.9
Fam*In_YSM	-14.8	6.2	6.6	5.3
Ref*In_YSM	10.3	10.6	33.8	12.1
No quals	REF		REF	
UK qual below deg	38.0	7.8	25.1	6.4
UK 1st deg	23.8	8.8	17.6	8.0
UK high deg	32.0	7.4	22.3	7.1
For qual <deg	5.0	5.5	15.1	4.7
For qual deg or >	23.4	5.9	20.9	5.1
Missing qual info	27.1	5.1	20.9	4.4
No children	REF		REF	
Single parent	27.5	13.0	9.1	4.4
Couple parent	15.9	3.0	10.6	3.0
Missing parental status	4.3	6.5	10.6	6.0
Poland	REF		REF	
Afghanistan	136.1	13.7	138.9	15.2
Australia	43.7	14.9	13.6	15.7
Bangladesh	147.2	10.6	154.3	9.5
China	55.7	13.9	74.5	10.8
France	-42.2	18.5	-44.1	13.2
Germany	-6.6	16.1	6.1	10.8
Ghana	76.2	12.7	99.9	11.0
India	123.0	8.2	119.3	7.0
Iran	90.9	12.9	88.2	13.5
Iraq	112.8	12.4	141.7	15.0
Ireland	-52.6	12.3	-48.5	10.1
Italy	-24.4	15.6	-28.7	15.8
Jamaica	106.8	15.9	113.6	12.9
Kenya	151.0	14.1	135.8	11.8
Lithuania	-89.9	36.6	-31.0	17.3
New Zealand	58.3	18.3	49.2	16.7
Nigeria	110.8	10.5	119.7	9.6
Pakistan	143.1	8.8	149.0	7.6
Philippines	132.1	11.4	126.7	8.6
Portugal	15.3	15.4	-8.9	14.3
Romania	51.1	16.4	68.7	14.3

Slovakia	-44.1	45.0	33.7	15.6
Somalia	114.2	13.7	117.8	11.2
South Africa	133.9	10.2	122.5	9.0
Spain	-29.8	21.3	-36.5	16.9
Sri Lanka	115.3	10.8	103.2	10.0
Turkey	82.2	12.0	94.9	11.4
United States	5.4	13.9	5.6	11.1
Zimbabwe	102.9	11.4	110.9	9.8
Other A8	-18.2	20.8	13.9	11.7
Other Africa	106.0	8.9	120.5	7.7
Other Americas	81.0	10.6	69.8	8.5
Other Asia	85.5	9.4	73.0	7.6
Other EU15	-20.8	14.2	-18.6	10.6
Born elsewhere	93.9	9.5	87.1	7.9

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows full parameter estimates from models of British national identity by gender. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.

Table A11: Robustness check: selected parameter estimates from probit models of national identity by gender, with and without control for legal citizenship

	Probit models			
	Men		Women	
	A	B	A	B
Citizen		168.6 (3.6)		167.6 (3.1)
Motives				
Work	REF		REF	
Student	-4.4 (4.4)	-0.8 (4.9)	-1.1 (4.5)	5.1 (4.9)
Family	34.7 (3.9)	22.2 (4.4)	22.5 (3.5)	15.0 (3.9)
Refugee	31.4 (5.5)	16.1 (6.2)	28.5 (6.1)	23.7 (6.9)
Years since migration				
ln_YSM	86.0 (4.2)	42.5 (4.7)	78.4 (4.7)	42.6 (5.2)
Student*ln_YSM	35.6 (6.6)	11.1 (7.3)	28.1 (6.9)	9.7 (7.6)
Family*ln_YSM	-14.8 (6.2)	-11.9 (6.9)	6.6 (5.3)	3.2 (5.8)
Refugee*ln_YSM	10.3 (10.6)	-11.4 (11.7)	33.8 (12.1)	9.7 (13.4)
Other controls				
Intercept	-387.0 (14.4)	-296.0 (15.6)	-351.1 (14.7)	-279.3 (16.0)
Means	36.3	36.3	38.5	38.5

Source: LFS 2010-2014. Notes: This table shows selected parameter estimates from models of British national identity by gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. The columns labelled 'A' show results from models with controls for origin, arrival age, highest qualification, and parental status, and the columns labelled 'B' show results from models with an additional control for legal citizenship. The sample consists of 11,160 men and 13,734 women aged 21-64, who were born abroad, who arrived in the UK as adults, and who have been in the UK for at least five years. n=24,894.